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TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE:
DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE
CONTEXT OF NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
MARK R. FONDACARO"
INTRODUCTION
The struggle for comprehensive reform of the health care delivery system
in the United States has reached another impasse.' As in the past, both social
and economic factors have driven reform efforts. From a social standpoint,
over thirty-six million Americans are presently uninsured, many of them
young children and adolescents.2 Universal access to health care is a long-
term objective of several major proponents of national health care reform.'
* Research Assistant Professor, Center on Children, Families, and the Law. University
of Nebraska-Lincoln. J.D. Columbia Law School (1991), Postdoctoral Scholar, Stanford Medi-
cal School (1985-1987), Ph.D. Indiana University (1985), B.A. State University of New York
at Stony Brook (1979). i am grateful to Professors Charles Black, Jr., Frank Grad, and Mi-
chael Wald for their generous advice, encouragement, and support. I am particularly indebted
to Professor Peter Strauss for introducing me to the intellectual and practical challenges of
administrative law. Eric Hermanson, Janet O'Keeffe, and Professors Craig Lawson and Gary
Melton provided helpful feedback and comments on an earlier draft of this article; Kristi
Kennedy and Julie Meacham provided valuable research assistance. This research was made
possible through support provided by NIMH, Columbia Law School, and the Nebraska De-
partment of Social Services. The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the
author and are not necessarily endorsed by the supporting institutions.
1. Ira Magaziner, senior policy advisor to President Clinton, noted that:
[Clomprehensive health care was first proposed some 80 years ago by President
Theodore Roosevelt. President Franklin Roosevelt initially included a national health
care program as part of Social Security, but it was later dropped. Presidents Tru-
man, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all had health care proposals that were never
enacted ....
Magaziner Seeks Support of UFCW for Clinton Health Reform Plan. DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 144, at D-I I (July 29, 1993).
2. Number of Uninsured Persons Increased to 36.6 Million in 1991, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 7, at A-Il (January 12, 1993). Currently, over 9.5 million children in the United
States are without health insurance. Id. Adolescents may be the most vulnerable. Recent
studies suggest that one in every seven, nearly 5 million adolescents, aged 10-18, do not
have any health insurance. Many more are underinsured. Paul W. Newacheck et al., Financ-
ing Health Care for Adolescents: Problems, Prospects, and Proposals, II J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH CARE 398, 399 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Foreword: Health Care Reform in the United
States-The Presidential Task Force, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 6 (1993) (citing universal
coverage as an objective of the Clinton Administration's health care reform proposal); see
also H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (sponsored chiefly by Representative Richard
Gephardt to ensure "individual and family security through health care coverage for all
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This means millions of presently uninsured Americans stand a chance of being
covered by some form of health insurance when and if comprehensive health
care reform efforts eventually succeed.
From an economic standpoint, cost-containment is a central objective of
recent health care reform efforts. The high priority given to health care reform
by the current Administration is rooted at least as much in the necessity of
controlling spiraling health care costs as in the desire to provide universal
coverage.4 Political pressures have increased to contain the administrative
costs of providing all health care benefits. The resolution of the tension be-
tween these apparently conflicting social and economic objectives will impact
the nature, scope, and quality of benefits ultimately guaranteed under national
health care reform legislation, and indeed, may determine whether or not com-
prehensive reform efforts succeed at any level.
Cost-containment efforts potentially will target the health care claims
review and appeals process. The existing public and private health insurance
systems provide widely varied procedural safeguards to ensure that individuals
who are denied health insurance benefits have such decisions reviewed in a
timely and fair manner. Existing grievance and appeal procedures range from
trial-like administrative hearings and judicial review to reconsideration of a
denied claim by an insurance provider representative without opportunity for
further review.'
On the one hand, formal trial-like procedural safeguards,6 which seeming-
ly provide the most stringent due process protections, can be criticized as
time-consuming, costly, and an inefficient use of administrative and judicial
resources.7 Accordingly, efforts to extend and incorporate such safeguards to
Americans").
4. See Bruce Babbitt & Jonathan Rose, Building a Better Mousetrap: Health Care
Reform and the Arizona Program, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 243, 281 (1986) (quoting Lester C.
Thurow, Medicine Versus Economics, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 611, 611 (1985)) ("The federal
government used to view health care as a social problem. Today it views it almost solely as
a budget-deficit problem. The shift in perspectives is important. Social problems can be left
to fester; budget-deficit problems require more immediate solution.")
5. See infra part IV.A-D.
6. Recent health care reform plans proposed by the Clinton Administration and by
Congress would establish procedures for reviewing health care claim denials that include
opportunities for administrative review and appeal, alternative dispute resolution, and judicial
review and enforcement. See infra part V.A.I-A.6. Many competing health care reform bills
were submitted to Congress earlier in the health care reform process, including: S. 491, 103d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) sponsored chiefly by Senator Wellstone; S. 1770, 103d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1993) sponsored chiefly by Senator Chafee; H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
sponsored chiefly by Representative Cooper; and H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993)
sponsored chiefly by Representative Michel. As is more typically the case with health care
legislation, these competing proposals generally were less comprehensive and less detailed
with regard to due process considerations than are the proposals evaluated in the final sec-
tion of this article.
7. 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 9.2, at 6 (3d ed. 1994) ("[Tlhe kind of procedural safeguards due process requires for
individualized government determinations would be prohibitively expensive and time-consum-
ing if they were required for determinations that affect a large number of people."); see infra
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protect consumers from arbitrary denials of health care coverage are likely to
run into increased resistance in the context of growing demands for cost-con-
tainment and administrative efficiency. On the other hand, health care reform
initiatives and market-based reforms aimed at encouraging the use of managed
care may create new incentives to reduce services in an effort to contain
costs.' While such service reductions ideally will be aimed at unnecessary and
ineffective treatments, there will be increased pressures to ration care, particu-
larly more expensive treatments and services. These conditions precisely illus-
trate the pronounced need for procedural mechanisms which ensure that pa-
tients are not erroneously denied necessary health care.
Overall, the reform of the health care delivery system in the United States
has been and will continue to be an ongoing and dynamic process. Regardless
of the specific timing and nature of health care reforms adopted, there will be
increased demands on the claims review process as health care coverage is
provided to those who are presently uninsured. Likewise, mounting economic
pressures toward cost-containment in the delivery of health care services will
create an additional burden on the claims review process if more people begin
to feel that their requests for services or reimbursement are being unjustly
denied. Thus, any health care reform program ultimately adopted will need to
develop a claims review process that strikes an appropriate balance between
fairness, accuracy, and efficiency in decision making.
The topics of due process and procedural justice have been the focus of
considerable legal scholarship as well as social science research. Social science
research has focused on the assessment of both subjective and objective as-
pects of procedural justice, including the capacity of procedures to influence
individuals' subjective perceptions of procedural fairness and their ability to
promote bias reduction and accuracy in decision making. Similarly, legal stan-
dards of procedural due process traditionally have focused on the promotion of
fairness and accuracy in decision making. Additionally, constitutional stan-
dards of procedural due process increasingly have required that considerations
of fairness and accuracy be balanced against the government's interest in
administrative efficiency and cost-containment. 9
This article draws on both legal scholarship and social science research to
examine and evaluate alternative procedures for reviewing health care benefit
denials. Section I discusses legal aspects of procedural due process, including
threshold constitutional issues, administrative review, alternative models of
administrative justice, and judicial review and enforcement. Section II reviews
the social science literature on procedural justice, covering subjective and
objective aspects of procedural justice. Legal and psychosocial criteria for
evaluating procedural justice are compared and synthesized in Section III. The
procedural mechanisms for reviewing health care benefit denials under the
present Medicaid, Medicare, Managed Care, and fee-for-service systems are
reviewed in Section IV; these procedural mechanisms are evaluated against
part I.
8. See infra part IV.C.
9. See infra part I.A-E.
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legal and psychosocial criteria for assessing procedural justice. The administra-
tive review and appeal procedures outlined in health care reform plans recently
proposed by the Administration, the House, and the Senate are evaluated
against procedural justice criteria in Section V. Finally, general guidelines and
conclusions regarding the evaluation of procedural justice under national health
care reform are presented in the Conclusion.
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Considerations of "fundamental fairness" are at the heart of due process
analysis in our constitutional democracy.'" Efforts to define the parameters of
due process and fundamental fairness traditionally have emphasized the impor-
tance of "truth seeking" as well as the promotion of individual and public
perceptions that justice has been done." Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,2 discussing the
objectives and consequences of procedural due process protection, illustrates
this point:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for
generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done. 3
Justice Frankfurter also recognized that due process is an evolving, flexi-
ble construct, highly dependent on context for its meaning; it is not "a techni-
cal conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstanc-
es." 
14
Over the years, the Supreme Court has echoed Justice Frankfurter's senti-
10. See, e.g., Goss v. Lope, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (requiring the State to use "fun-
damentally fair procedures" in the context of school suspensions).
11. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. Ii, 124 (1978). The Supreme
Court's references to subjective perceptions of fairness have been relatively oblique-the
Court has more typically ignored or down-played the importance of perceptions of fairness
from the subjective standpoint of the individual. Id. at 122.
12. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
13. Id. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 162. Justice Frankfurter elaborated on the flexible nature of the due process
construct as follows:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feel-
ing of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American
constitutional history and civilization, 'due process' cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness be-
tween man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government,
'due process' is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and
stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due
process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
Id. at 162-63.
[Vol. 72:2
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ments about the evolving nature of due process analysis and the importance of
context and flexibility in approaching issues of due process and fundamental
fairness." Accordingly, the dramatic increase in the number of claims for
government administered benefits has brought about increased recognition that
resources are limited and that government benefits must be administered in
ways that promote not only fairness and objectivity, but also timeliness, effi-
ciency, and cost-containment. 6
A. Threshold Constitutional Issues
The United States Constitution prohibits the federal and state governments
from depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' 7 To determine the scope of due process protection, the threshold
question is whether state action is involved."8 The Federal Constitution only
comes into play in cases involving government or state action.'9 Second, the
government must threaten to deprive a person of liberty or property to which
he or she is legally entitled before constitutional safeguards are required." In
the health care context, this means that the legislative scheme must create an
entitlement to health care services which the Supreme Court would character-
ize as a property interest.2' Finally, if it is established that the legislative
15. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) ("The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible proce-
dures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require cita-
tion of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.").
16. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theo-
retical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) (arguing that the
elements of fair procedure associated with due process of law in adjudicatory proceedings are
inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claim adjudications which require processes
that will assure the accuracy of claims adjudications).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (determining that termination
of benefits given by statutory entitlement involves state action, which triggers minimum
constitutional requirements of procedural due process).
19. The Fifth Amendment applies to "government action" by the federal government
and the Fourteenth Amendment applies to "state action" taken by state governments.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10-7 (2d ed. 1988). The terms
"state action" and "government action" are sometimes used interchangeably. See id. § 18-1,
at 1688 n.2.
20. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Due Process Clause applies only to those
government actions that deprive an individual of "life," "liberty," or "property." Although the
Court analyzes each of these interests separately and in a way that narrows the scope of due
process protection, commentators have suggested that the Court is not required to do so;
some have argued that the scope of the Due Process Clause should reach "any important in-
terest." 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 9.4, at 21; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 409 (1977) ("all interests valued by
sensible men").
21. Certain health care services could conceivably be characterized as involving interests
in liberty or even life, although the Supreme Court may neither be inclined nor find it nec-
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scheme does involve state action and a potential deprivation of property or
liberty, the analysis turns on a determination of "what process is due" in that
particular context.
Constitutional standards reflect the bare minimum requirements of proce-
dural protection against arbitrary government action. In the health care context,
as in other contexts, Congress may establish by statute process rights in the
private realm that parallel those guaranteed by the Constitution in the public
realm. Moreover, in both the public and private spheres, Congress may estab-
lish procedural requirements that exceed the minimum constitutional stan-
dards. - But irrespective of whether a particular health care delivery system is
considered public, private, or a hybrid of both, standard procedures are needed
to guide the review of claims for services or reimbursement that have been
denied.2  Constitutional standards of procedural due process typically have
served as the starting point in the development of administrative procedures
for reviewing the claims denial process.
24
B. Administrative Review
Any evaluation of modern administrative review procedures must begin
with the case of Goldberg v. Kelly,2' decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1970. The Court addressed whether state regulations that allow the
termination of welfare payments with no opportunity for an evidentiary hear-
ing prior to termination of payments violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Goldberg, individuals facing termination of welfare payments were
provided informal pretermination review procedures, but many of the tradition-
al trial-like process features such as the opportunity for personal appearance,
oral presentation of evidence, or confrontation and cross-examination of ad-
verse witnesses were not included.26 Individuals whose payments were ter-
essary to do so. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 9.4, at 42 (suggesting that lack of
analytical coherence makes it difficult to predict whether the Court will characterize an inter-
est in a way that triggers due process protection).
22. See id. § 9.1, at 2 ("Legislatures and agencies can, of course, choose procedures
more demanding than those dictated by due process, but their choice of procedures is influ-
enced heavily by their beliefs concerning the procedures required by due process.").
23. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 270 (1990) (suggesting the
procedures followed by the public insurance payers are based on considerable delegation of
authority to private and quasi-private decision makers). Legal scholars have argued there is a
special need for judicial review in situations like this, where entitlements are conferred out-
side the decision-making institution. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and
Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 182, 202 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1977).
24. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 9.1 (suggesting that constitutional standards
of due process and the Supreme Court's due process reasoning have a considerable influence
on the procedural choices of legislatures and agencies).
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. Id. at 258-59. Local social service officials proposing to suspend a recipient's wel-
fare assistance were required to comply with the following pretermination procedures. A
caseworker who had doubts about a welfare recipient's continued eligibility for benefits was
[Vol. 72:2
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minated as the result of the informal pretermination review process were enti-
tled to a post-termination "fair hearing."" This involved a proceeding before
an independent state hearing officer at which the recipient could appear per-
sonally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a
record made of the hearing. If the recipient prevailed at the fair hearing, he or
she was paid all funds erroneously withheld. A recipient whose aid was not re-
stored by a fair hearing decision was entitled to judicial review. 8
Primarily, the Court had to decide whether the Due Process Clause re-
quires an oral evidentiary hearing before the recipient's benefits are terminat-
ed.29 The Court indicated the termination of welfare benefits involved "state
action"3 and characterized welfare payments as property that could not be
arbitrarily withdrawn by the government.3 The Court noted that welfare pro-
vides "the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical
care" 32 and that due process requires in part a consideration of the extent to
which a person may be "condemned to suffer grievous lOSS. '33 The Court
viewed the termination of welfare benefits as a potential "grievous loss" that
clearly triggered due process protection under the Federal Constitution.34
The Court acknowledged the relationship between due process and respect
for human dignity." The Court also recognized the government interest in
prevention of the "societal malaise" or demoralization associated with the
erroneous denial of welfare payments.36 As will be discussed below, similar
required first to discuss those doubts with the recipient. If the caseworker concluded that the
recipient was no longer eligible, he or she made a recommendation to a unit supervisor to
terminate the aid. The caseworker was then required to send a letter to the recipient stating
the reasons for proposing to terminate aid and notifying the recipient that within seven days
he or she could request that a higher official review the record. The recipient could support
the request with a written statement prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or
other person. If the reviewing official affirmed the determination of ineligibility, aid was
stopped immediately and the recipient was informed by letter of the reasons for the action.
The letter informed the recipient that he or she could request a post-termination hearing. Id.
27. Id. at 259.
28. Id. at 259-60.
29. Id. at 260.
30. Id. at 262.
31. Id. at 263 n.8.
32. Id. at 264.
33. Id. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Justice Frankfurter stated "that the right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a principle basic to our
society." McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168.
34. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 ("[Tiermination of aid pending resolution of a controver-
sy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits."). The Court acknowledged the basic considerations of survival at issue in
Goldberg and noted that this crucial factor was not a consideration for "virtually anyone else
whose governmental entitlements are ended." Id. Thus, the Court seemed to focus narrowly,
almost exclusively on the welfare context in Goldberg; however, similar "life and death"
considerations may apply in certain health care contexts as well.
35. Id. at 264-65 ("From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.").
36. Id. at 265.
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demoralization costs may result from the erroneous denial of valid health care
claims.
In addressing the question of what procedures are required, the Court held
that an evidentiary hearing must be provided before welfare benefits can be
terminated. Although the required hearing need not take the form of a formal
judicial trial," the recipient is entitled to the following procedural safeguards
or process features: 8
* Timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination;
" Personal appearance before the decision maker;
" Oral presentation of arguments and evidence;
" Opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
* Right to retain an attorney at personal expense;
* Statement by the decision maker indicating the reasons for the deter-
mination and the evidence relied on; and
* Impartial decision maker who was not involved in making the deci-
sion under review.39
The Court concluded that "[tihe opportunity to be heard must be tailored
to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."'' Thus,
due process required an oral hearing in the welfare context because the Court
considered written submissions to be
an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational
attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain pro-
fessional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the
flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to
mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard
as important."
Thus, the Court suggested, at least for an indigent person, an oral hearing
would better serve the interests of fairness and accuracy of decision making.
An oral presentation would allow the individual to more effectively express
his or her point of view, which, in turn, would provide the decision maker
with better information on which to base a decision.4"
Following Goldberg, there was what some commentators referred to as a
"due process explosion," characterized by the "tendency to judicialize adminis-
37. Id. at 266.
38. Robert Summers used the term "process feature" to denote the specific procedural
mechanisms that guide the administrative review process. See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values", 60 CORNELL L. REV. I, 8
(1974). Summers notes that process features are based on the rules and norms that define
the process at hand and "can be found in the constitutive and regulative rules (and other
norms) that define the process." Id. at 15.
39. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71.
40. Id. at 268-69.
41. Id. at 269.
42. See Saphire, supra note 11, at 163-65 (providing a strong statement of the value of
personal appearance and oral participation in the hearing process).
[Vol. 72:2
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trative procedures."43 In an influential article addressing this issue, Judge
Henry Friendly concluded:
In the mass justice area the Supreme Court has yielded too readily to
the notions that the adversary system is the only appropriate model
and that there is only one acceptable solution to any problem, and
consequently has been too prone to indulge in constitutional codifica-
tion. There is need for experimentation, particularly for the use of the
investigative model, for empirical studies, and for avoiding abso-
lutes.'
Judge Friendly suggested "that the elements of a fair hearing should not
be considered separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitu-
tionally demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for
diminishing or even eliminating another."" For example, with regard to the
need for an unbiased tribunal, he noted that "the further the tribunal is re-
moved from the agency and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be
the need for other procedural safeguards.""4o
More recently, the Supreme Court has held that the full range of proce-
dural safeguards required in the welfare context does not necessarily extend to
other administrative contexts. Rather, the Court typically has applied a balanc-
ing test, which was first clearly articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge."
Mathews focused on the termination of disability benefits under the Social
Security Act (the "Act"). In contrast to its decision in Goldberg, the Court
held in Mathews that disability benefits, unlike welfare benefits, could be
terminated without a prior evidentiary hearing." The Court indicated that due
process analysis requires consideration of the following three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
43. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268-69
(1975); accord JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8-9 (1985).
44. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1316.
45. Id. at 1279. Judge Friendly nonetheless compiled a prioritized list enumerating the
factors that have been considered to be elements in a fair hearing: (1) unbiased tribunal, (2)
notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity to present
reasons why the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the right to call witnesses, (5) the
right to know the evidence against one, (6) the right to have the decision based only on the
evidence presented, (7) counsel, (8) the making of a record, (9) a statement of reasons, (10)
public attendance, and (11) judicial review. Id. at 1278-95.
46. Id. at 1279. Judge Friendly recognized that the term "hearing" has an oral connota-
tion, but suggested that in some circumstances a hearing could be based on written materials.
Id. at 1270. He was particularly critical of the universal need for cross-examination and
noted its tendency to result in delay and the polarization of ongoing relationships. Id. at
1284-86.
47. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
48. Id. at 349.
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail."
In analyzing the private interests at stake, the Court noted that, unlike
welfare determinations, eligibility for disability benefits is not based on finan-
cial need and, therefore, the disabled worker's need for government assistance
is likely to be less, particularly for those who have access to private resourc-
es."' Moreover, the right to retroactive relief5' for disability benefits denied
improperly seemed to soften the Court's view of the degree of potential de-
privation suffered by the majority 2 of claimants in the disability context.53
In evaluating the fairness and reliability of the pretermination procedures
in effect and the probable value of additional safeguards, the Court considered
medical assessments for purposes of disability determination to be "more
sharply focused and easily documented ... than the typical determination of
welfare entitlement.""4 The Court characterized such medical assessments as
"'routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists.' 5
Based in part on this characterization of medical evidence, the Court conclud-
ed the value of oral presentation and the opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses is substantially less in the disability context than in the welfare
context. 6 The Court emphasized the reliability and probative worth of written
medical reports and concluded that such reports do not raise the "'specter of
questionable credibility and veracity."'5 7 Therefore, the Court held that the
opportunity to provide written submissions prior to the termination of benefits,
coupled with the opportunity for a post-termination evidentiary hearing and
judicial review, satisfied the requirements of due process. 8
The final prong of the Court's analysis in Mathews focused on an assess-
ment of the public interests, including administrative burdens and other soci-
49. Id. at 335.
50. Id. at 340-42.
51. Id. at 340 ("Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full retro-
active relief if he ultimately prevails, his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this
source of income pending final administrative decision on his claim."). In the health care
context, as more people are treated under a managed care model, health care claim denials
will focus not only on reimbursement for services already provided, but also on decisions
about whether specific health care services should be provided at all in a given case. It is in
this later context of treatment denial that retroactive relief is more likely to be an inadequate
remedy.
52. Id. at 344 ("[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent
in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.").
53. Id. at 341 ("IT]he degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a partic-
ular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative de-
cision making process.").
54. id at 343.
55. Id. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
56. Id. at 344-45.
57. Id, at 344 (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 407).
58. Id. at 349. Some commentators have noted that the Supreme Court seems to over-
value costly post-termination trial-type hearings, often requiring such hearings even after
adequate pretermination hearings already have been provided. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
7, § 9.3, at 19.
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etal costs associated with requiring pretermination hearings on demand. 9 The
Court emphasized the costs associated with increased numbers "of hearings
and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending deci-
sion."'  Unlike the decision in Goldberg, the Court's consideration of so
called "social costs" did not address issues of demoralization and loss of pub-
lic confidence associated with erroneous benefit denials. Rather, in support of
its holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination
of disability benefits, the Court stressed the financial costs and administrative
burdens associated "with the constitutionalizing of government procedures."6
The Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez62 illustrates that pre-de-
privation procedures characterized by informality and flexibility may nonethe-
less satisfy due process requirements. In Goss, the Court held that high school
students were entitled to an informal hearing prior to or within a reasonable
time after a ten day suspension. In addressing the question of what process is
due, the Court acknowledged that "the interpretation and application of the
Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and that '(t)he very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally appli-
cable to every imaginable situation."'63 The Court held that "students facing
suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest
must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing,"'
which includes oral or written notice of charges, and, if the charges are de-
nied, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity
for the student to explain his or her side of the story.65 Generally, the infor-
mal hearing should take place before the student is removed from school, thus
providing the student with a predeprivation opportunity to be heard.' Note
that the informal hearing format in the school suspension context does not
include the opportunity to secure counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses,
or to call witnesses to support the student's version of the facts.67
Neutrality and impartiality on the part of the decision maker are generally
considered to be core requirements of procedural due process.68 In Schweiker
59. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
60. Id.
61. Id. Overall, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the balancing test articulated in
Mathews, although there are some general trends. "The Court almost never accords a full ad-
versary hearing prior to termination. Typically, the process due is notice of the grounds for
decision plus some sort of opportunity for response prior to the deprivation, with something
approaching a full evidentiary hearing available after the deprivation." Cynthia R. Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 196 (1991).
62. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
63. Id. at 578 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
64. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 581.
66. hi. at 582. However, under the limited circumstances in which a student poses a
continuing danger or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process, the student may
be immediately removed from school, followed as soon as practicable by the necessary no-
tice and informal hearing. Id. at 582-83.
67. Id. at 583.
68. Note that Judge Friendly placed an "unbiased tribunal" at the top of his prioritized
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v. McClure, ' the Court focused on the impartiality of the decision making
process associated with Medicare Part B payments for physician services and
outpatient care.7" At the time of the decision, the Medicare program autho-
rized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to contract with private
insurance carriers to administer payment of Part B claims.7 If the carrier re-
fused to pay a portion of a claim, the claimant was entitled to a "review deter-
mination," based on the submission of written evidence and arguments." For
disputes involving at least $100, a dissatisfied claimant also was entitled to an
oral hearing, which was conducted by an officer chosen by the carrier. No fur-
ther provision was made for the review of the hearing officer's determina-
tion.73
The Schweiker Court held that the hearing procedures did not violate due
process requirements and that claimants were not entitled to a de novo hearing
conducted by an administrative law judge. 4 The Court indicated that due pro-
cess does require impartiality on the part of those who function in a quasi-
judicial capacity, including hearing officers. However, there is a rebuttable
presumption that these officers are unbiased. "This presumption can be rebut-
ted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for
disqualification."'" The decision maker is particularly vulnerable to charges of
bias when he or she has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.76
The Supreme Court has operationalized the opportunity to be heard re-
quirement in varied ways, ranging from trial-like predeprivation hearings in
the welfare context," to informal hearings prior to school suspension," to
reliance on post hoc tort remedies for excessive corporal punishment.79 Over-
all, the Supreme Court's procedural due process jurisprudence emphasizes the
balancing of factors associated with fair and accurate decision making against
the government interest in conserving administrative and fiscal resources. The
promotion of impartiality is thought to contribute to both fairness and accuracy
list of I I factors considered to be elements of a fair hearing-judicial review was placed
last. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1278-95.
69. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
70. See discussion infra part IV.B.
71. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 190.
72. Id. at 191.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 195, 200.
75. Id. at 195.
76. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). This line of cases
suggests that a procedure allowing an individual with a financial stake in the outcome of a
health care benefit determination (e.g., an insurance carrier, a treating physician) to function
in a quasi-judicial capacity in evaluating claims could run afoul of the Due Process Clause.
But see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (general economic interest in subject
matter of dispute not enough to disqualify decision maker where no disciplinary proceeding
is underway).
77. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71.
78. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975).
79. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
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in decision making.
C. Objectives of Administrative Procedure: Fairness, Accuracy, and
Efficiency
Clear and consistent definitions of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency are
difficult to discern from either case law or commentaries addressing issues of
administrative due process. In fact, the task of defining administrative objec-
tives, such as accuracy, fairness, and efficiency is a necessary first step in
determining what contributes to their pursuit."0 In one of his early works in
this area, Mashaw defined accuracy as "the correspondence of the substantive
outcome of an adjudication with the true facts of the claimant's situation and
with an appropriate application of the relevant legal rules to those facts. Accu-
racy is thus the substantive ideal; approachable but never fully attainable.""1
Mashaw argues that in contexts where there is no objective external standard
for accuracy, "[tihe nearest approximation to an index of accuracy is consis-
tency in adjudication: if like cases are being treated alike by state agencies,
then claimants are at least receiving formal justice through the existing proce-
dures. In a closed hierarchal structure with no external referents consistency
and accuracy tend to merge." 2 He points out, however, that an emphasis on a
sole criterion such as accuracy tends in practice to "dwarf soft variables" such
as perceived justice and fairness, which are difficult to quantify."
Efficiency, on the other hand, results when an administrative system accu-
rately adjudicates claims for benefits in a cost-effective and timely manner. 4
Administrative costs often are seen as the least problematic costs to assess in
an adjudicatory system because they are easily measurable and can be ex-
pressed in money terms.85
Definitions of fairness often focus on "the degree to which the process of
making claims determinations tends to produce accurate decisions." 6 Note
80. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILI-
TY CLAIMS 195 (1983).
81. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 774-75.
82. Jerry L. Mashaw. The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 44 (1976). Mashaw argues that oral evidentiary hearings are unlikely to
improve accuracy or consistency in decision making when adjudications are mostly concerned
with difficult value judgments. Such decisions elude objective verification and truly can be
legitimized only by authority or consent. Consent is obviously preferred in a democracy.
Accordingly, Mashaw argues that oral hearings provide the procedural approximation to con-
sent by allowing full participation in the decision making process. Id. at 45.
83. Id. at 48.
84. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 775; MASHAW, supra note 80, at 79-85.
85. MASHAW, supra note 80, at 98. Mashaw believes that administrative costs can cause
serious problems when they are "shifted or traded off against other costs that are neither
measurable nor monetizable." Id. A central thesis of this article is that so called "soft vari-
ables" such as "fairness" and "justice" can be quantified through the use of social science
methods.
86. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 775. Mashaw acknowledges later in the same article that
fairness involves more than accuracy in decision making in some contexts and must be "ap-
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that this definition emphasizes objective aspects of procedural fairness, but
does not encompass subjective aspects of fairness, such as the degree to which
claimants perceive that they were treated fairly. However, Professor Rand
Rosenblatt suggests:
[I]t is important to remember that the value of consumer participation
and agency explanation does not lie solely in the opportunity to se-
cure a different outcome .... [T]he right to be heard from, and the
right to be told why ... express the elementary idea that to be a
person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is
done with one." Expressed in political terms, this root concept of
human dignity highlights the need for a reconstruction of the demo-
cratic process, in which consultation over fundamental human needs
is not made meaningless by a labyrinthine bureaucracy.87
This perspective seems to recognize and acknowledge the psychological
importance of voicing one's concerns, independent of whether the expression
has any influence on the ultimate decision made. It also suggests that fairness
involves something more than accuracy in decision making or a desirable
outcome."s As will be discussed below, this view has received considerable
support from social science research.89
Along similar lines, Mashaw has proposed a "dignitary theory" of due
process which focuses "on the degree to which decisional processes preserve
and enhance human dignity and self-respect."' The theory is grounded in the
perspective that "the effects of process on participants, not just the rationality
of substantive results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public
decision making."9 Mashaw acknowledged early social science research by
Thibaut and Walker92 which demonstrated that "people seek to maximize
their personal involvement in decisional processes and that they gauge the
fairness of processes by the degree of that participation."9 However, Mashaw
praised by an independent evaluation of the process elements of adjudication," including a
supplementary check on the procedures and routines used to bring relevant information before
the decision maker. Id. at 797.
87. Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 264 (1978) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 19, § 10-7, at 666) (foot-
note deleted).
88. See Summers, supra note 38, at I (arguing for the importance of evaluating not
only the results of a legal process, but the process itself). Summers distinguishes between
result efficacy and process values, suggesting that
a law-applying process that is procedurally rational, humane, and respectful of indi-
vidual dignity and personal privacy is good in those respects as a process, quite
apart from whether it is also an efficacious means to good results (just convictions,
just acquittals, etc.). For procedural rationality, humanity, and regard for dignity and
privacy are 'process values.'
Id. at 3.
89. See infra part lI.B.
90. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981).
91. Id.
92. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975).
93. Mashaw, supra note 90, at 887.
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was critical of this empirical research and suggested that their work may
"merely demonstrate that we generally regard control or the opportunity for
personal strategic behavior as the best protection for our substantive con-
cerns."' He went on to acknowledge, however, that people seem to value
participation in the political process for its own sake and speculated that this
may be true for other processes as well. 5 This hunch has been borne out by
recent social science research which will be discussed and analyzed in Section
II.
Although evidence that people intrinsically value the opportunity to voice
their concerns and to be heard may encourage legislators to adopt or develop
statutory schemes that take this into consideration, the more difficult issue
from a jurisprudential standpoint is finding a constitutional justification for the
protection of such process values. Mashaw suggested that a dignitary perspec-
tive moves in this direction.
He based his analysis on a family of theories he called "the "liberal tradi-
tion," which has at its core the notion that "individuals are the basic unit of
moral and political value."' Mashaw drew on the works of Immanuel Kant
whose second formulation of the categorical imperative is seen as the core
value of liberal thought and a basis for a dignitary approach to due process.
This formulation commands that each person should be treated as an end,
never merely as a means to an end.97 Thus, participation is seen as a process
by which individuals are treated as ends in themselves.
Kant's categorical imperative provides an aspirational goal but falls short
of specifying defined limits on process claims. According to Mashaw, John
Rawls attempted to render Kant more determinate in his book, A Theory of
Justice."5 Rawls proposed two basic principles of justice. The first principle
requires strict equality with respect to basic liberties, which include universal
suffrage with majority rule, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and
freedom from arbitrary arrests. Infringements of these basic liberties are per-
mitted only when such infringements increase the amount of liberty experi-
enced by everyone." Rawls' second principle of justice requires: "(a) that
inequalities be attached to positions and offices available to all under condi-
tions of fair equality of opportunity and (b) that advances in the position of
better-off persons be limited by the requirement that the position of the worst-
off be maximized."'
Drawing on Rawls' work, Mashaw outlined a constitutional strategy for
94. Id.
95. Id. at 888.
96. Id. at 907. Professor Cynthia Farina has suggested that one of the major problems
with the due process doctrine is its focus and emphasis on the autonomy of isolated individ-
uals rather than on the nature of the relationship between people and the government. Farina,
supra note 61, at 191.
97. Mashaw, supra note 90, at 913 (citing 1. KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 39 (L. Beck trans. 1959) (ist ed. Riga 1785)).
98. Id. at 917 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).
99. Id. at 917-18.
100. Id. at 918.
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implementing dignitary values which includes a two-tier hierarchy of process
values. The first tier includes basic process values such as equality, minimal
rationality, and privacy. These values are seen as having strong claims to
constitutional protection via judicial review. A second tier of derivative values,
including "individualization" and "direct participation," "present prima facie
constitutional claims for realization.''. These derivative claims can be bal-
anced against competing values and defeated on the basis of the necessary
trade-off among competing values. Although these derivative claims may have
weak constitutional status, they may nonetheless serve as powerful guides to
statutory construction. 2
Overall, although Mashaw makes a legitimate case for the constitutional
status of dignitary interests, he acknowledges that liberal theory fails to pro-
vide "a robust vision of process values.""' Other commentators have come
to share this pessimistic view of the constitutional status of human dignitary
interests."° As will be discussed below, however, even in the absence of
strong constitutional justifications for protecting process rights, there is a long
line of social science research which suggests that there are important policy
justifications for insuring that process rights are acknowledged and enforced
by statute in health care reform legislation.
D. Models of Administrative Justice
In Bureaucratic Justice, Mashaw outlines three models of due process and
bureaucratic justice that have implications for the development of a procedural
framework to guide the administrative review process: (1) professional treat-
ment, (2) moral judgment, and (3) bureaucratic rationality.0 5 Mashaw asserts
that the "justice" of an administrative decision is evaluated in terms of "those
qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the acceptability of
its decision."" For example, proponents of the professional treatment model
adopt the view that decisions should provide appropriate support or treatment
from the perspective of relevant professional cultures. Advocates of the moral
judgment model, on the other hand, believe that the fairness and acceptability
of decisions should be assessed in light of traditional trial-like processes for
determining individual entitlement. Finally, proponents of the bureaucratic
model argue that decisions should be accurate and efficient realizations of the
101. Id. at 924-25.
102. Id. at 925.
103. id. at 930.
104. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 61, at 216 (discussing inconsistency between the
individual's dignitary interests in consent based on free choice, and the individual's potential
decision to seek freely benefits from the government in spite of the fact that process rights
and dignitary interests are not respected). Professor Farina critiques procedural due process
jurisprudence in general, pointing out "its schizophrenic dependence upon and rejection of the
dictates of the legislature, its simultaneous overprotection and underproduction of interactions
between people and their government, its contorted view of the value of process." Id. at 190.
105. MASHAW, shupra note 80, at 23-25.
106. Id. at 24-25.
[Vol. 72:2
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
legislative will.'0 '
The professional judgment model is reflected in our current health care
decision making and delivery system and is based on the goal of patient satis-
faction with service delivery. Under this approach, the primary value to be
served by the medical professional is the elimination of a patient's health
complaints, which involves both objective and subjective considerations. For
example, Mashaw contends:
Curing a patient by eliminating a physically identifiable pathology
may be good science, but if the patient still feels sick it is not good
medicine. The objective is to wield the science so that it produces
good as defined by the patient. This entails interpersonal and diagnos-
tic intuition-clinical intelligence-as well as scientific knowl-
edge.
08
An administrative system for health care coverage based on professional
treatment would, therefore, be client-oriented. It would seek to provide those
services that particular clients need to improve their well-being. Treatment is
tailored to the physician's resources: some patients are rejected or given less
attention so that others, who are more needy, may be given more help. In the
professional treatment model, the physician:
combines the information of others with his or her own observations
and experience to reach conclusions that are as much art as science.
Moreover, judgment is always subject to revision as conditions
change, as attempted therapy proves unsatisfactory or therapeutic
successes emerge. The application of clinical judgment entails a rela-
tionship and may involve repeated instances of service-oriented deci-
sion making."°
Under this approach to administration, "[s]ubstantive and procedural rules,
hierarchical controls, and efficiency considerations would all be subordinated
to the norms of the professional culture."" Overall, the legitimating value of
this approach is client service and the primary goal is client satisfaction. More-
over, the ongoing nature of the relationship between patient and physician is
emphasized.
In contrast, the moral judgment model is most similar to civil or criminal
trials and is concerned primarily with the ability of individuals to assert their
rights to benefits.' The process involves individual determinations to de-
cide, on balance, who is to be preferred in the context of conflicting and com-
peting interests. Mashaw asserts:
This entitlement-awarding goal of the moral judgment model
gives an obvious and distinctive cast to the basic issue of adjudicatory
resolution. The issue is the deservingness of some or all of the parties
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 28.
110. Id.
III. Id. at 21.
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in the context of certain events, transactions, or relationships that give
rise to a claim.
The... "justice" of this model inheres in its promise of a full
and equal opportunity to obtain one's entitlements."'
The overall legitimating value of the moral judgment model is fairness, and
the primary goal is conflict resolution." 3
Accuracy and cost-effectiveness of claims processing are at the heart of
the bureaucratic model. Mashaw summarizes this approach as follows:
A system focused on correctness defines the questions presented
to it by implementing decisions in essentially factual and technocratic
terms. Individual adjudicators must be concerned about the facts in
the real world that relate to the truth or falsity of the [claim]. At a
managerial level the question becomes technocratic: What is the least-
cost methodology for collecting and combining those facts about
claims that will reveal the proper decision? To illustrate by contrast,
this model would exclude questions of value or preference as obvi-
ously irrelevant to the administrative task, and it would view reliance
on nonreplicable, nonreviewable judgment or intuition as a singularly
unattractive methodology for decision. The legislature should have
previously decided the value questions ....
From the perspective of bureaucratic rationality, administrative
justice is accurate decision making carried on through processes ap-
propriately rationalized to take account of costs." '
Thus, the legitimating values of this approach are obviously accuracy and
efficiency and the primary goal is program implementation.
Overall, each of the models proposed by Mashaw is associated to varying
degrees with each of the distinct yet overlapping objectives of administrative
procedures: fair, accurate and efficient decision making. Fairness and accuracy
in decision making also have been the subject of considerable social science
research on procedural justice. In fact, the moral judgment model's emphasis
on fairness from the patients' standpoint has much in common with the social
science research on subjective aspects of procedural justice. Likewise, parallels
exist between the bureaucratic justice model's emphasis on accuracy in deci-
sion making and empirical research on objective aspects of procedural justice.
These issues will be addressed more fully in Section III.
On a more systemic level, Mashaw has argued that the elements of proce-
dural fairness usually associated with due process in traditional adjudicatory
proceedings may be inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claims
adjudications. As a result, adjudication in this context may require a broader
112. Id. at 30-31.
113. Id. at 31.
114. Id. at 25-26.
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conceptualization of due process." 5 Mashaw argues that
the purposes, necessary modes of operation, and clientele of social
welfare programs so severely limit the value of procedural safeguards
and appellate checks in assuring accurate and timely adjudication of
social welfare claims that there is a need for additional safeguards on
the integrity of this very important segment of the administrative
process." 6
The development of a management system for assuring adjudication quality in
claims processing is one such additional safeguard.
The inadequacies of traditional adversary procedures include the excessive
opportunities they provide for obfuscation, delay, and high costs which may
impede access to the adversary process." 7 These problems have led to in-
creased acceptance of positive case management as a legitimate strategy for
achieving fair, accurate, and cost-effective results. This reflects a shift in focus
from "passive judicial reliance on adversary processes and toward positive
judicial management of adjudication.""' This change in focus is based in
part on the notion that social welfare claims center on a determination of
eligibility for statutorily created benefits rather than on conflict resolution
between disputing parties." 9 Moreover, claims adjudicators are more likely
than judges to be engaged in the affirmative implementation of specified legis-
lative policies. Overall, due process analysis has become increasingly con-
cerned with systemic effects rather than individual injustices and has taken on
a more managerial orientation.'2 1 Some commentators have suggested that
this shift is in part a response to the "practical needs of the modern adminis-
trative state."'-'
The development of a management system of quality assurance to supple-
ment traditional procedural safeguards requires the establishment of standards
and the evaluation of performance against those standards. Corrective action is
then required to upgrade substandard performance. 22 Different standards
may be established for the same procedural objective in different administra-
tive contexts. Thus, the specific standards of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency
established in the health care context may be somewhat different from those
115. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 775.
116. Id. at 775-76.
117. Id. at 776.
118. Id. at 779.
119. i. at 780. However, the relevance of this reasoning to the health care context is
limited. Cost-containment measures may directly pit the economic interests of health care
providers and insurers against the economic and health care interests of patients, creating a
conflict between disputing parties.
120. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 373 (1993). This systemic focus is reflect-
ed in the Supreme Court's assertion in Mathews that "procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality
of cases, not the rare exceptions." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
121. Fallon, supra note 120, at 373.
122. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 791.
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established in the context of a public assistance program. In general terms
though, accuracy in decision making requires the correct finding of facts and
the application of relevant program policies to those facts, as well as the exer-
cise of judgment. Fairness may overlap with accuracy but requires a supple-
mentary check on the "adjudicatory procedures and routines which are meant
to place the relevant facts, policies, and arguments before the adjudicator and
to facilitate sound decision making-things such as case development effort,
articulation of the bases for decisions, adequate notification of actions to the
claimant, and explanation of opportunities for appeal."'23 Finally, efficiency
may be quantified and assessed by the time spent in claims processing and
appeals and the administrative resources required for decision making (includ-
ing the number of levels of review in the appeals process, as well as the num-
ber of reviewers and their qualifications).
Quality assurance requires ongoing evaluation of decisions and the use of
appropriate sampling techniques to promote economy and efficiency. The
collection of information on the quality of adjudications should not be subject
to the control of the adjudicators whose decisions are being evaluated, and the
information collected should be useful to those in charge of improving claims
processing.' 24 However, such quality control procedures should not complete-
ly obviate the need for more traditional procedural protection given that man-
agement practices are directed at system level problems rather than the correc-
tion of individual decisions.'25 Presumably, however, the need and demand
for individualized appeals and judicial review will be reduced by effective
quality assurance procedures.
E. Judicial Review and Enforcement
Judicial review may nonetheless serve as an important check on the exer-
cise of authority by program administrators.'26 Federal judges in particular
have life tenure, which presumably enhances their ability to function in an
independent and objective manner. Courts currently apply various standards of
review, depending on the nature of the issues examined. The scope of review
"determines how far a court can go in overturning or remanding an agency
decision."' 27 Judicial review may involve questions of fact, questions of law,
and questions of law application. The standard of review varies across these
123. Id. at 797.
124. Id. at 803.
125. Id. at 804.
126. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of
American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 439, 443 (1993) (suggesting
that courts perform at least three important functions in carrying out their rights-enforcing
role: "(1) a 'blocking function,' blocking illegal, often grossly illegal agency actions or refus-
als to act; (2) an 'unmasking function,' forcing into political daylight the gap between
statutory standards and agency structure and performance; and (3) a 'rationality function,'
requiring agencies to articulate their policies and explain them in relation to goals") (citations
omitted).
127. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.2
(1993).
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domains.
In on-the-record adjudicatory proceedings, courts typically apply the "sub-
stantial evidence test" to review agency fact finding."' s Substantial evidence
has come to mean "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.""1 9 Under this test, a court will affirm
an agency's finding of fact even if it would not have made the same decision
on its own, if substantial evidence in the record supports the agency's find-
ing."' Obviously, this is a highly deferential standard of review. Even more
deferential, at least in theory, is the arbitrary and capricious test used by courts
to review informal agency adjudications. 3' Because the substantial evidence
test is highly deferential in its own right, courts have found it difficult in
practice to explain the differences between the substantial evidence and arbi-
trary and capricious tests. The difference appears to be "too subtle to explain
in a manner that is useful to agencies, courts, or practitioners."'
On the other hand, courts engaging in de novo review can make their own
independent findings of fact in addition to examining the record below. The de
novo standard of review allows the court to weigh the facts and use its own
judgment to overrule findings with which it disagrees.'33
As a general matter, courts are more likely to take an independent ap-
proach to reviewing questions of law."3 However, "[t]he farther removed
one becomes from the text of a statute in determining the legality of agency
action, the more likely a court will defer to an agency's interpretation." ' In
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,'36 the Supreme Court
articulated the following two-step approach for reviewing questions of law:
If ... Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute .... Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute. 1
37
This test suggests that once some ambiguity is found in the statutory text,
the court is obliged to defer to an agency's permissible construction of the
statute. More recently, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,'38 the Supreme Court re-
treated somewhat from this highly deferential standard. The Court indicated
that a court must defer to the agency's interpretation only after traditional
128. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
129. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
130. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.4.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
132. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 11.4.
133. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.6.
134. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-91 (1947).
135. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.7.2, at 467.
136. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
137. Id. at 843.
138. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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tools of statutory construction fail to provide an answer.'39 In any event,
these cases suggest that the best way to ensure the potency of judicial review
as an enforcement tool is to clearly spell out important legislative objectives in
the statutory language. 140
A specific standard of judicial review, such as de novo review or the
substantial evidence test, may be explicitly authorized by statute. 4' Although
de novo review may be most desirable from the standpoint of those who advo-
cate the moral judgment model, some courts and commentators have noted
that de novo review of cases already decided at the administrative level is a
costly and inefficient use of judicial resources.' Moreover, the shift to a
more systemic approach to due process means that courts increasingly review
administrative decisions with an eye toward ensuring the agency is acting
within the discretion granted to it by the legislature. 43 Thus, increasingly,
the court's main objective is not to second guess the outcome in a particular
case but to determine whether the process provided to claimants is fair. Not-
withstanding this shift in emphasis, the opportunity for judicial review may
have symbolic significance to claimants and contribute to public perceptions
that justice has been done.'" As a result, individuals who feel they do not
have adequate access to the courts may perceive that they are receiving second
class justice.
The next question becomes how much judicial review is necessary or
desirable in the health care context. The answer here may depend partly on the
nature and structure of the claims processing system established to review
denied claims. If dispute resolution procedures are put in place between claim-
ants and the courts to insure that fair and accurate decisions are made in a cost
139. See id. at 446-48.
140. See Rosenblatt, supra note 87, at 366 n.421 ("Indeed, one of the major lessons of
the health care reform experience is that Congress should define explicit standards and reme-
dies in future legislation seeking to benefit unorganized interests.").
141. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.6, at 459.
142. Id. § 13.1, at 436. Given that cost-containment is a primary consideration in the
national health care reform debate, proposals to provide for de novo judicial review of all
denied health care claims are not likely to be politically viable. However, given the fact that
particular standards of review may be established by statute, it may be possible to propose a
standard that offers most of the benefits of de novo review (including the ability to chal-
lenge assertively decisions denying health care claims in a responsible manner), without in-
curring the costs associated with re-trying the entire matter.
For example, judicial review of factual matters could be based on an independent
judicial reexamination of the record rather than a mere determination of whether the adminis-
trative findings are supported by substantial evidence. The court could be authorized by
statute to reach its own legal and factual conclusions based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence on the record. New factual disputes could be remanded to the administrative body for
resolution. The modified record would then be subject to independent judicial review, if
necessary. This approach would put more teeth into the judicial review process without bur-
dening the courts with the obligation of completely re-trying appealed cases.
143. See Fallon, supra note 120, at 336.
144. This is obviously an empirical question that deserves more systematic study. It is
possible that the significance and symbolic value of judicial review may be somewhat inflat-
ed in the minds of the legally trained.
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effective manner, the need and demand for more costly judicial review is
likely to decline. If a legally and publicly acceptable system is established,
then the courts will serve their function primarily by overseeing the integrity
of the system. If an adequate system is not established, then more judicial
scrutiny will be required by law and demanded by the public. Such increased
demands could overwhelm judicial resources, particularly regarding the review
of claims under a health care system with increased incentives for reducing the
utilization of costly services. In any event, the development and continued
refinement of grievance and appeal procedures for reviewing health care claim
denials should be informed by the growing body of social science research on
procedural justice and dispute resolution.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A PSYCHOSOCIAL ANALYSIS
A. Background and Theory
The emergence of procedural justice as a field of social science research
is usually traced to the publication in 1975 of Procedural Justice: A Psycho-
logical Analysis by Thibaut and Walker.'45 It was a seminal effort to apply
social-psychological methods to the assessment of fundamental differences
between the adversary and inquisitorial decision making procedures followed
by American and certain European courts, respectively. The book provided an
empirically based analysis of theoretical issues in legal procedure.'46 In re-
viewing this early work, Professor Tom Tyler, a behavioral scientist who has
expanded on this line of investigation, points out:
Thibaut and Walker's treatment of procedural justice involved
attention to both subjective and objective issues. On the subjective
level, they suggested that citizens preferred the adversary system,
which they felt was procedurally fairer. This heightened perception of
fairness, in turn, led them to be more willing to accept verdicts ar-
rived at following the adversary procedure. Thibaut and Walker also
initially asserted that the adversary system was fairer on objective
grounds. They later modified this position to suggest that the adver-
sary system was more likely to lead to decisions that those involved
would feel were fair, while the inquisitorial system was better at
finding "truth."' 47
Thibaut and Walker proposed a general theory of procedure for dispute
resolution in varied legal contexts, including civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings.'48 They characterized "truth seeking" and "distributive justice"
as the primary objectives of dispute resolution, recognizing the apparent di-
145. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92. For a comprehensive review of procedural
justice research, see Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice Research, I SOC. JUST. RES. 41
(1987).
146. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92, at 5.
147. Tyler, supra note 145, at 42 (citation omitted).
148. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541,
542 (1978).
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chotomy and potential conflict between these objectives.'49 The distribution
of control over the decision making process was considered to be the most
important factor in characterizing a procedural system." Moreover, they
made a distinction between control over the decision and control over the
process. Decision control reflects "the degree to which any one of the partici-
pants may unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute."'' Process con-
trol "refers to control over the development and selection of information that
will constitute the basis for resolving the dispute."'52 Both decision and pro-
cess control can be in the hands of either a third party (e.g., a judge or arbitra-
tor) or the disputants.
An autocratic system, that is, a system which delegates both process and
decision control to a disinterested third party, was considered by Thibaut and
Walker to produce the most accurate results.'53 On the other hand, proce-
dures that assign process control to the disputants were considered more likely
to foster the idea that "justice" has been done."M Thibaut and Walker postu-
late that providing disputants with the opportunity to state their claim provides
the best assurance that the process will be perceived as fair and the ultimate
decision accepted as being justly decided, regardless of whether the outcome is
favorable.' 5 They suggest, however, that when rules and standards become
more precise, the decision maker's function becomes "less directed toward
justice and more directed toward truth."'
56
149. Id. at 541-42. According to Thibaut and Walker, truth seeking is associated with
accuracy in decision making and distributive justice is associated with the fair apportionment
of outcomes. Id. "In conflicts about the most accurate view of reality, such as scientific dis-
putes, the objective is to determine the truth according to a standard." Id. at 541. They
"suggest that an autocratic procedure is most likely to attain this objective." Id. On the other
hand, "[clonflicts about the apportionment of outcomes, such as inconsistent claims to the
division of assets or losses, are best resolved with the aim of achieving distributive justice."
Id. at 541-42. They use the term autocratic procedure to mean one in which the decision
maker has a high degree of control over the gathering of information and the ultimate deci-
sion reached. Id. at 546-47; see also John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974).
150. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 148, at 546.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 547 & n.15.
154. Id. at 548-49.
155. Id. at 551.
156. Id. at 553. Thibaut and Walker acknowledge that many disputes involve a high de-
gree of conflict over both truth (characterized as a cognitive conflict) and justice
(characterized as a conflict of interest). They propose a two-staged approach to such mixed
disputes. The first stage focuses on truth seeking and resolving issues of fact; the second
stage focuses on resolving policy questions. During the initial phase, procedures for resolving
issues of fact must resolve the cognitive conflict in spite of a continuing conflict of interest.
Therefore, Thibaut and Walker suggest that total decision control should be allocated to a
third party at the initial stage. Furthermore, the decision maker should be allocated a degree
of process control, given the truth seeking objective of the first stage. Some process control
must be retained by the disputants at this stage because the conflict of interest inherent in
the relationship between them remains, even though the explicit goal at this stage is to re-
solve the cognitive aspects of the dispute. According to Thibaut and Walker, the decision
control of the third party must be strong in the initial phase. At the second stage, questions
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Thibaut and Walker's work has spawned a great deal of empirical re-
search on the topic of procedural justice. The remainder of this section will
examine the subjective and objective elements of procedural justice that have
been the focus of empirical investigation by behavioral and social scientists.
B. Subjective Procedural Justice
Recent empirical research has focused on using quantitative methods to
assess subjective aspects of procedural justice. Subjective procedural justice is
defined as "the capacity of each procedure to enhance the fairness judgments
of those who encounter procedures."" 7 As mentioned above, Thibaut and
Walker postulated in their early work that the main ingredient of procedural
justice is the optimal distribution of control between the disputants and the
third party decision maker. They proposed that the "distribution of control
constitutes the basic variable or dimension for analyzing, comparing, and
assessing the justice of all forms of dispute resolution, legal and nonlegal.'
58
The first generation of empirical studies conducted by Thibaut and Walker
revealed the following with respect to subjective factors. First, when disputants
are allowed to choose among methods of dispute resolution that differ in the
degree of third-party control over the decision or outcome of the dispute, most
study participants preferred arbitration or trial-like procedures, followed in
order by mediation, autocratic third-party decision making, and bargaining
procedures. Preferences move toward increased third-party (e.g., judge) control
when the dispute involves a high degree of conflict, when a clear standard is
present, and when there is time pressure.'59 Second, Thibaut and Walker
identified a general preference among study participants for adversary over
inquisitorial procedures. Adversary representation induced greater trust and
satisfaction with the procedure and produced greater satisfaction with the judg-
ment, independent of the favorableness of the judgment to the participant."6
Third, participant satisfaction with the procedure, perceived fairness of the
procedure, and satisfaction with the opportunity to present evidence all in-
creased as procedural methods moved from the inquisitorial to the ad-
versarial. 6' Moreover, greater opportunity to present evidence was associated
with higher levels of perceived fairness and satisfaction.'62 Finally, subjects
involving social values would then be left to procedures that allow for the weighing and
balancing of policy considerations and other relevant factors. Id. at 563-65.
For example, if questions of medical science are at issue, the decision maker should
be a health care expert (or a panel of experts) who is fully able to evaluate competently the
particular claims in dispute. Legally trained generalists typically would not meet these stan-
dards. Moreover, representatives should be health care experts, not necessarily legal advo-
cates. See id. at 564.
157. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 3-4 (1988).
158. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92, at 2.
159. Id. at 14-15.
160. Id. at 80.
161. Id. at 94.
162. Id. at 88-89.
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who were placed behind a "veil of ignorance" (in that they were kept unaware
of whether they were advantaged or disadvantaged by the evidence in their
case) judged adversary procedures "to be the most preferable and the fairest
mode of dispute resolution.""' Even those who were informed about the evi-
dence in their case (i.e., placed in front of the veil of ignorance) preferred
adversary procedures and judged them to be most fair."M
More recently, in summarizing a second generation of empirical research,
Tom Tyler concluded that procedural justice studies consistently demonstrate
that "people are as concerned with the fairness of the way decisions are made
as they are with the fairness of those decisions."'6 "Procedural justice has
been found to be important across methods, areas of study, consequences, and
situational variations."'" Moreover, procedural justice research has expanded
into alternative dispute resolution settings.'67 In reviewing this work, Tyler
suggests that litigants are very concerned with receiving fair process in resolv-
ing their disputes. "Often, however, litigants' conceptions of fair process differ
from the need to have a formal trial and can be accommodated in informal
dispute resolution settings. Typically litigants want a chance to state their
grievance before a neutral third party who will consider their position and
make a decision."'6
Tyler points out that Thibaut and Walker interpreted their research results
to suggest that when parties must surrender a significant amount of decision
control to another, they nevertheless seek to maintain it indirectly by maximiz-
ing control over the presentation of their case to the decision maker. 69 This
type of control is referred to as process control or "voice" and reflects an in-
strumental view of process control where voice is used to maximize outcome
control. "Others have argued that people intrinsically value the opportunity to
state their case, irrespective of whether what they say influences what the
decision maker does. This has been referred to as a value-expressive perspec-
tive on voice."" T
According to Tyler, recent research comparing instrumental and value
expressive perspectives on voice indicates that litigants generally focus more
on process control than on decision control. Disputants find the expression of
their side of the argument to have value in itself, particularly when they are
assured that their arguments are given adequate consideration by the decision
maker.' Even those who receive unfavorable outcomes are more likely to
perceive the process as fair if the decision maker articulates the basis and
rationale for the adverse decision.'72 Overall, the research suggests that
163. See id. at 113-15.
164. hI.
165. Tyler, supra note 145, at 41.
166. I. at 43.
167. Id. at 44.
168. Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
169. id. at 52.
170. I.
171. Id.
172. I. at 52-53.
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"there is more to process fairness than simply the fairness of the outcomes a
procedure produces."'7 As will be discussed further below, disputants also
value being treated with dignity and respect.
Gerald S. Leventhal proposed a multidimensional framework for concep-
tualizing justice which distinguishes between outcomes and procedures and
proposed the following six rules of fair procedure: (1) consistency (across
persons and time), (2) suppression of biases (impartiality), (3) accuracy of
information (quality of decision), (4) correctability (availability of appeal pro-
cedures), (5) representation or "voice" (the amount of access to or input into
all stages of the decision-making process), and (6) ethicality (the extent to
which the decision-making procedure is compatible with the fundamental
moral and ethical values accepted by the individual, including the desire to be
treated with dignity and respect).
7 4
Initial empirical tests of Leventhal's model demonstrated that across dif-
ferent types of situations involving allocation decisions, subjective appraisals
of the following factors contributed most to judgments and perceptions of
procedural fairness: consistency (across persons), accuracy of information,
ethicality (dignified, respectful treatment), and bias suppression. That is, indi-
viduals who perceived the decision making process to be more consistent,
accurate, respectful of personal dignity, and impartial viewed the overall pro-
cess as being more fair. The most surprising finding was that correctability or
the opportunity for appeal was not a very important factor in individuals'
perceptions of procedural justice. Consistency in treatment across persons
emerged as a particularly important determinant of subjective appraisals of
procedural fairness.'75
Tyler combined the criteria identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and
Leventhal (1980) to examine procedural justice in the context of citizen expe-
riences with the police and courts. 76 Tyler noted that Thibaut and Walker's
process control and decision control criteria are compatible with Leventhal's
173. Id. at 56.
174. Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches
to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEO-
RY AND RESEARCH 27 (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds.. 1980). Leventhal defines a justice rule
as "an individual's belief that a distribution of outcomes, or procedure for distributing out-
comes, is fair and appropriate when it satisfies certain criteria." Id. at 30. He describes two
categories of justice rules: distribution rules and procedure rules.
A distribution rule is defined as the individual's belief that it is fair and
appropriate when rewards, punishments, or resources are distributed in accordance
with certain criteria. A specific criterion might require the matching of rewards to
contributions, or matching rewards to needs, or dividing rewards equally. Thus a
contributions rule, needs rule, and equality rule are among the major distributive
rules that can influence an individual's perception of distributive fairness ...
. . A procedural rule is defined as an individual's belief that allocative
procedures which satisfy certain criteria are fair and appropriate.
Id.
175. Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Alloca-
tion Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 296, 300 (1986).
176. Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 106 (1988).
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representation criterion. He therefore combined measures of decision and
process control into a single index measuring representation.' Tyler also as-
sessed separately the following three facets of Leventhal's impartiality criteri-
on: honesty, effort to be fair, and lack of bias.' Thus, Tyler used the fol-
lowing eight criteria to assess judgments of procedural fairness: (1) representa-
tion, (2) consistency, (3) lack of bias, (4) honesty, (5) effort to be fair, (6)
quality of decisions, (7) correctability, and (8) ethicality.'
Tyler evaluated the importance of these procedural justice criteria by
examining the relationship between citizens' appraisals of their experiences on
each criterion and their overall judgments about whether they were fairly
treated.8 He conducted two types of analysis. In the first, he determined the
simple correlation between each criterion and overall judgments about proce-
dural fairness. The following seven criteria were significantly correlated with
judgments of procedural fairness: effort to be fair, ethicality, representation,
honesty, lack of bias, quality of decisions, and consistency. Correctability was
the only criterion that was not significantly related to judgments of procedural
fairness. "'
In the second analysis, Tyler used multiple regression analysis to deter-
mine the relative importance of each criterion in predicting procedural fair-
ness.' 8 2 The results of the multiple regression analysis revealed that seven of
the eight procedural justice criteria examined made an independent contribu-
tion to overall assessments of procedural fairness-consistency was the only
criterion that did not make an independent contribution to judgments of proce-
dural fairness when all the other criteria were considered simultaneously. 3
However, the citizen experiences studied by Tyler included a wide range of
177. Id. at 104-06.
178. See id. at 128-31.
179. Id. at 103.
180. Id. at 121.
181. Id. at 121-22. The Pearson correlation coefficients between overall judgments of
procedural fairness and each of the eight procedural justice criteria were as follows: effort to
be fair (r = .71), ethicality (r = .69), representation (r = .62), honesty (r = .59), lack of
bias (r = .43), quality of decisions (r = .37), consistency (r = .32), and correctability (r =
.04, p < .05) which was the only criterion that was not significantly related to judgments of
procedural fairness. See id. at 122.
182. See id. at 121.
183. i. at 121-23. In the multiple regression analysis, Tyler "computed the beta weight
for an equation in which all the criteria were entered simultaneously. This latter number
indicates the independent contribution of each factor." The results of the regression analysis
revealed the following: sixty-nine percent of the variance in citizen judgments about proce-
dural fairness was explained by the procedural justice criteria examined. The respective beta
weights (B) for the seven procedural justice criteria which made an independent contribution
(p < .01) to overall assessments of procedural fairness were as follows: the efforts of author-
ities to be fair (B = .30), their honesty (B = .23), whether their behavior was consistent
with ethical standards of dignity and respect (B = .21), whether opportunities for representa-
tion were given (B = .17), quality of decisions made (B = .17), correctability (B = .14), and
lack of bias (B = .07). The beta weight for consistency, which did not make an independent
contribution to judgments of procedural fairness when all the other criteria were considered
simultaneously, was .04. See id. at 122.
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formal and informal interactions with police and the courts, only some of
which could be characterized as disputes. Tyler suggested that the lack of con-
sistency effects found here "might stem from the fact that most of the
respondents' experiences were not disputes between contending parties.""'
In fact, Tyler found that consistency did matter more when disputes were
involved. When only disputes were examined, consistency did make an inde-
pendent contribution to judgments of fairness.' For disputes, the following
specific criteria made independent contributions in predicting overall judgment
of fairness: representation, ethicality, quality of decision, honesty, and consis-
tency. Again, opportunity for appeal was not an important or statistically sig-
nificant factor in citizens' perceptions of procedural fairness in the context of
dispute resolution. Representation or "voice" emerged as the most important
factor, followed by the desire to be treated ethically and with respect.86
C. Objective Procedural Justice
Objective procedural justice is defined as "the capacity of a procedure to
conform to normative standards of justice, to make either the decisions them-
selves or the decision-making process more fair by, for example, reducing
some clearly unacceptable bias or prejudice."'87 Thus, objective procedural
justice is consistent with one of the primary objectives of bureaucratic models
of justice-accuracy in decision making. As both legal scholars and social
scientists have pointed out, one of the major challenges in attempting to evalu-
ate procedures against objective criteria is the difficulty in identifying or estab-
lishing relevant objective standards. 88 Notwithstanding this challenge, some
important advances have been made in illuminating procedural characteristics
that promote accuracy in decision making. This body of research has been
published in some of the most distinguished law reviews and social science
journals.
The work of Thibaut, Walker and their colleagues is illustrative. They
studied the capacity of adversary and inquisitorial procedures to minimize
pretrial bias and to maximize the amount and accuracy of information consid-
ered by the decision maker. 9 They primarily addressed whether adversary
184. Id. at 127.
185. See id. at 126-27.
186. Id. at 125-27; see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 108 (presenting this data
clearly in table format). For disputes, the significant beta weights (p < .05) in descending
order of magnitude were as follows: representation (B = .38), ethicality (B = .21), quality of
decision (B = .16), honesty (B = .15), and consistency (B = .12). The beta weight for
correctability, which was not statistically significant, was .04 (p > .05). Id. Although the
results reported by Lind & Tyler apparently summarize the same material described above by
Tyler at pages 126 and 127, there are two minor discrepancies: the results reported by Tyler
at page 126 fail to indicate the significance of the quality of decision beta weight and indi-
cate a beta weight of .08 for correctability rather than the .04 beta weight reported in Lind
& Tyler.
187. LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 3.
188. Id. at 19; see also Mashaw, supra note 82, at 44.
189. John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision making, 86
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or inquisitorial presentation of evidence in the subsequent test case would
decrease prior expectancy bias by leading decision makers to rely less on their
past experiences and more on the particular facts of the case immediately
before them."9 The results revealed that subjects with prior biasing experi-
ences who were exposed to new evidence by adversary procedures relied less
on their prior experiences than those in the inquisitorial condition. Thus, ad-
versary presentation apparently contributes to decreased bias and increased
decision making accuracy by reducing decision maker reliance on prior expec-
tancies. "i'
In another study, Lind, Thibaut and Walker investigated whether the use
of adversarial versus inquisitorial procedures influenced the amount and accu-
racy of information ultimately presented to legal decision makers.'92 Law
students who were assigned the role of adversarial attorney were instructed to
present their client's case in a way that would result in the most favorable
outcome for their client. Other law students who were assigned the role of an
inquisitorial attorney were instructed to present their evidence in a manner that
would be most helpful to the judge in making a just determination.'93
Generally, adversary and inquisitorial attorneys gathered about the same
number of facts. However, when the facts disfavored the attorney's client,
attorneys in the adversary role engaged in more diligent search for facts that
supported their client's position. When the evidence in the ca e was either
balanced or favored the attorney's client, there were no differen es between
adversary and inquisitorial attorneys in terms of the number of facts they
sought; both adversary and inquisitorial attorneys tended to present evidence to
the decision maker that reflected the true nature of the case. When the weight
of the evidence was against their client, adversary attorneys presented evidence
biased in favor of the disadvantaged client."9 Thus, the adversary model re-
sulted in a bias that made unbalanced cases look more balanced than they
really were.
Other research by Sheppard and Vidmar has demonstrated that witnesses'
subsequent testimony is influenced by prior interviews with an adversary attor-
ney."9 Witnesses' subsequent testimony was found to be more supportive of
HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972); see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 19-21 (discussing
this study and related research).
190. See Thibaut et al., supra note 189, at 391-95.
191. Id. at 401.
192. Alan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and
Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1973); see also LIND & TYLER, supra
note 157, at 22-25.
193. Lind et al., supra note 192, at 1132-33. Some of the students were given evidence
that was balanced evenly in terms of whether or not it supported their client's case. Others
were given evidence that favored one side or the other, with 75% of the evidence either
favoring or disfavoring their case, depending on whether they were assigned the favored or
unfavored condition. Thus, there were three conditions: balanced (50% favored-50%
disfavored), favored (75% favored-25% disfavored), and disfavored (25% favored-50%
disfavored). Id. at 1136-37.
194. Id. at 1138-39.
195. Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial
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the side represented by the adversary attorney who had interviewed them
previously. Prior interviewing by an inquisitorial attorney did not have a sig-
nificantly biasing effect on subsequent testimony."
Other studies also have examined accuracy/fairness trade-offs when com-
paring adversary and inquisitorial procedures. For example, Vidmar and Laird
studied the extent to which merely being called to testify by one side or the
other in an adversary trial biased witness testimony. 97 Subjects were shown
a slide presentation of an incident involving alleged assault.' Subjects were
divided into three groups and asked to testify about the incident as a witness
either for the plaintiff, the defense, or the court. Those testifying for the plain-
tiff clearly presented their testimony in a manner that favored the plaintiff;
similarly, the testimony of defense witnesses was more favorable to the de-
fense. Those testifying for the court presented the most balanced testimo-
ny. 199
The results also revealed that biased witness testimony had an influence
on judges' evaluations of the evidence. Judges viewed testimony provided by
witnesses testifying for the plaintiff as more favorable for the plaintiffs case.
Likewise, testimony provided by witnesses testifying for the defense was
perceived by judges as more favorable to the defendant's case.2' Thus,
merely being called by one side or the other in an adversary trial can bias
witness testimony and contribute to less accurate determinations by judges.
In sum, the empirical studies on objective aspects of procedural justice
reviewed above seem to raise the following policy dilemma: whether it is
preferable to choose procedures that are perceived as more fair and reduce the
decision maker's prior expectancy bias (i.e., adversary procedures) or to
choose those procedures that contribute most to presenting accurate informa-
tion to the decision maker (inquisitorial procedures).2"' However, recent re-
search suggests that the dichotomy between these idealized forms of dispute
resolution (i.e., adversary on the one hand, inquisitorial on the other) does not
fully reflect the complexity of procedures actually used for dispute resolution
Evidence: Effects of Lawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 320, 329 (1980); see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 114-16.
196. Sheppard & Vidmar, supra note 195, at 325.
197. Neil Vidmar & Nancy M. Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on
Witnesses' Communication of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 888 (1983); see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 114-16.
198. Vidmar & Laird, supra note 197, at 891.
199. Id. at 893-95.
200. Id. Witnesses' own ratings of whether the evidence favored either the plaintiff or
defendant were not influenced by whether they were called by the plaintiff, the defendant, or
the court to testify. All witnesses rated the evidence as fairly balanced, with perhaps a small
but insignificant edge given to the plaintiffs side in the case. LIND & TYLER, supra note
157, at 116.
201. Lind & Tyler have argued that "we might find ways to allow free expression with-
out placing all aspects of evidence production in the hands of the disputants. Once such
hybrid procedures have been designed, additional research will be needed to determine
whether . . . the hybrid procedure retains the protection against prior-expectancy bias that ad-
versary procedures provide." LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 117.
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in varied judicial and administrative settings."2 For example, Sheppard stud-
ied individuals' preferences for adversary, inquisitorial, and hybrid procedures
(with combined adversary and inquisitorial features). The hybrid procedure
allowed disputants to fully express their arguments and evidence in the case,
but also allowed the judge to independently ask questions and seek out evi-
dence. The results revealed that subjects uniformly preferred adversary pro-
cedures over inquisitorial ones but had an even stronger preference for the
hybrid procedures.
Research by Sheppard and others suggests the feasibility of procedures
which balance the accuracy enhancing features of inquisitorial procedures and
the fairness enhancing potential of procedures that provide disputants with an
opportunity to voice their concerns This could be accomplished by allow-
ing claimants or disputants to present the evidence for their own case while
allowing the decision maker to independently seek out relevant information.
Finally, several recent studies of procedural justice have found that people
are more likely to accept negative outcomes from governmental institutions
without losing loyalty to those institutions if they believe that "decisions are
being made in a way that is procedurally [fair]." 2" That is, "procedural jus-
tice strongly influences institutional legitimacy and, through it, the acceptance
of institutional decisions."2 ' This line of research has obvious implications
202. See Blair H. Sheppard, Justice Is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our
Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953 (1985); see also
LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 86-87.
203. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness,
and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 361 (1994)(studying hybrid
alternatives to the standard adversary trial procedure).
Similarly, research on witness credibility suggests that it may be desirable to allow
claimants the opportunity to present their case orally, while allowing medical experts and
other witnesses to provide written submissions. Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, Fac-
tors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
169, 189-91 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982). Miller and Burgoon reviewed
research studies comparing different modes of testimony (live, written, video-tape, audio-tape)
in terms of their impact on observers' abilities to assess witness credibility and detect decep-
tion. Generally, observers were able to detect lying with about a 50% degree of accuracy.
There was no evidence to support the view that live testimony is essential to test witness
credibility. Id.
This suggests that on objective grounds, it may not be necessary for medical experts
and other witnesses to present live testimony at grievance and appeal hearings. Written sub-
missions by medical experts should suffice from an accuracy standpoint and would be desir-
able from a cost-containment standpoint. On the other hand, research on the subjective value
of free expression and voice suggests that allowing claimants to present their evidence orally
would promote subjective judgments of fairness while not sacrificing the accuracy of infor-
mation about claimant credibility provided to the decision maker. Moreover, decision makers
may be less likely to rely on their own normative and stereotypic expectations when testi-
mony is presented by the claimant from his or her unique vantage point, which may reduce
bias and improve accuracy in decision making. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 148, at
549.
204. Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 629, 645 (1989);
see generally Tom R. Tyler, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (exploring factors that
motivate people to follow the law).
205. Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and
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for public acceptance of national health care reform efforts driven partly by
the need to contain costs. These studies suggest that people will be more will-
ing to accept health care services delivered in a more cost conscious way if
they believe that the procedures for allocating these services are fair. Thus,
policy considerations may compel grievance and appeal procedures which
promote voice, consistency, dignity, and respect, despite a less than robust
constitutional mandate for such procedures.
III. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS OF LEGAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL CRITERIA FOR
EVALUATING DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
In general, there is considerable overlap in the criteria used by the legal
and social science communities to define and evaluate the varied facets of due
process and procedural justice. For example, courts and legal scholars have
focused on fairness and accuracy in decision making, emphasizing the latter
perhaps because so called "soft variables" such as fairness are more difficult
to operationalize, quantify, or measure. Social scientists also have studied
fairness and accuracy or bias reduction in decision making, and have attempt-
ed to refine and quantify the assessment of the more subjective aspects of
procedural fairness.
At a constitutional level, notions of fundamental fairness are at the heart
of due process analysis, although the boundaries of the fairness construct are
faint and vaguely defined. Nevertheless, the broad constitutional contours of
fundamental fairness clearly encompass elements of truth seeking and the
subjective perception that justice has been done.2"
Individuals faced with potential loss of liberty or property are entitled to
due process, which in the context of welfare claims includes traditional trial-
like procedural safeguards, such as the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to present arguments and evidence orally, to maintain legal
counsel, and to receive reasoned and substantiated decisions by an impartial
decision maker.7 When the individual interests at stake are not threatened
by the level of personal hardship identified in Goldberg,2"s the balancing test
established in Mathews2 ' requires the court to examine whether existing pro-
cedures pose a risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interests involved,
and whether new procedures can provide additional protection at an acceptable
cost.
Fairness, accuracy, and efficiency have been identified as major objectives
of administrative procedure. Procedures based on a moral judgment model
emphasize conflict resolution and seek to promote claimant satisfaction that
justice has been done. This approach values fairness over accuracy in decision
the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 621, 626 (1991).
206. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Black,
J., concurring).
207. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
208. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
209. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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making and does not consciously address issues of cost containment and ad-
ministrative efficiency. Bureaucratic rationality, on the other hand, emphasizes
accuracy and efficiency in decision making. Truth seeking is a primary objec-
tive, but not only for its own sake. Accuracy in decision making is considered
almost synonymous with fairness. Subjective aspects of procedural justice are
seen as intangible, unquantifiable factors which, at their worst, threaten to
cloud objectivity and drive up administrative costs. Finally, the professional
judgment model seeks to promote patient satisfaction and the preservation of
the ongoing relationship between patient and professional decision maker.
Individualized discretion is emphasized under this model, while objective
standards, consistency in decision making, and overall costs are not.
Legal scholars interested in administrative justice have focused on reform
at systemic and individual levels of analysis. At the systemic level, the devel-
opment of a quality assurance management system is seen as necessary to
supplement traditional appellate review in order to ensure consistency, accura-
cy, and efficiency in decision making. Increased efficiency makes the review
process more accessible and ensures that all individuals with legitimate claims
will have a real rather than a symbolic opportunity to be heard, due to de-
creased congestion in the grievance and appeal process. A management system
of quality assurance includes the following elements: positive case manage-
ment by the decision maker, establishment of standards where possible (e.g.,
treatment standards), periodic, independent assessment of decision making
quality, corrective action to upgrade substandard performance, and ongoing
evaluation.
At the individual level, Mashaw has argued that procedures have an im-
pact of constitutional significance on human dignitary interests. His taxonomy
of dignitary process values includes: (1) equality in the treatment and respect
given to both parties to a dispute, (2) rationality, (3) privacy, and (4) the de-
rivative interest in direct participation in the decision making process.
Social scientists have studied both subjective and objective criteria for
evaluating procedural justice. The subjective criteria include: representation
(voice), ethicality (concern for human dignity), quality of decision (perceived
accuracy), impartiality, consistency, and correctability (opportunity for appeal).
Notice the similarities between several of these procedural justice criteria on
the one hand, and the process values outlined by Mashaw on the other. That
is, note the correspondence between equality and ethicality, rationality and
consistency, participation and voice. For example, the process value of equali-
ty emphasizes the equal treatment of and respect for both parties, while the
procedural justice criterion of ethicality similarly emphasizes the importance of
treating a person with dignity and respect. Likewise, the process value of
rationality clearly encompasses the promotion of "correct decision making by
individual adjudicators,"2 ' which in the context of an administrative system
without external objective standards is generally assessed in terms of consis-
210. MASHAW, supra note 80, at 49.
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tency in decision making."' Finally, the relationship between the process
value of participation and the procedural justice criterion of voice is self evi-
dent. Interestingly, in the context of disputes, the procedural justice criteria
which most closely resemble the process values articulated by Mashaw (i.e.,
the procedural justice criteria of voice, ethicality, and consistency) were
among the most important determinants of subjective perceptions of procedural
fairness.
The most fruitful social science research on objective aspects of procedur-
al justice has focused on the issue of process control and has compared ad-
versarial, inquisitorial, and hybrid procedures in terms of their impact on the
accuracy of decision making. Evidence suggests that adversarial procedures
may reduce prior expectancy biases of decision makers; however, they also
encourage advocates to present a biased sample of evidence when the weight
of the evidence is against their client. Moreover, witnesses are more likely to
present biased testimony when they are interviewed by a partisan attorney or
when they are merely identified with one side of the case in an adversarial
proceeding. Inquisitorial procedures, on the other hand, are associated with
less biasing influences on both witnesses and on attorneys who are facing an
uphill battle. Overall, empirical evidence suggests that disputants prefer hybrid
procedures which allow them to fully express their arguments and evidence in
the case, but also allow the decision maker to independently ask questions and
seek out information.
The next section will examine the procedural mechanisms for reviewing
health care claim denials under the present Medicaid, Medicare, Managed
Care, and Fee-For-Service systems. The procedures used in each system to
review claim denials will be evaluated against selected legal and psychosocial
criteria summarized in this section.
IV. EXISTING PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR REVIEWING BENEFIT DENIALS
A. Medicaid
The Medicaid program was enacted by Congress in 1965 to help provide
for the health care needs of the poor. Medicaid is a joint federal/state health
insurance program which is administered largely at the state level." 2 Under
the Medicaid program, individuals are entitled to a fair hearing to challenge
eligibility determinations, dispute the denial of specific services, or contest
actions to reduce or terminate services." Federal regulations establish min-
211. Mashaw, supra note 82, at 44.
212. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare
and Medicaid Program Policy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 759 (1991) (discussing judicial review as a means of achieving policy objectives under
Medicaid and Medicare programs).
213. 42 C.F.R. § 431.200 (1994). Individuals meeting specified criteria for mental illness
or mental retardation have been authorized to use the Medicaid fair hearing and appeals
process to challenge decisions regarding their transfer or discharge from a skilled nursing
facility or to dispute determinations made during a pre-admission screening or an annual
review. Id.; see also 57 Fed. Reg. 56,450 (1992).
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imum procedural safeguards that must be followed by state medical assistance
programs in order to qualify for federal reimbursement." 4
If the decision of a local evidentiary hearing is adverse to the claimant,
the claimant must be informed of the decision and of the right to appeal the
decision to the state agency. The claimant may request that the state agency
review the decision de novo." 5 Unless the claimant specifically requests a de
novo hearing, the state agency hearing may consist only of a review of the
record by the agency hearing officer to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence." 6 If claimants do not request de novo hearings, some
administrative resources may be saved.
The hearing officer who participated in the local decision may not partici-
pate in the state agency hearing." 7 All hearings must be conducted by some-
one who was not directly involved in the initial determination of the action in
question. This policy apparently aims at decreasing actual bias and promoting
perceived impartiality.
Federal regulations do encourage some positive case management. For
example, if a hearing involves medical issues, such as those concerning a
diagnosis, an examining physician's report, or a medical review team's deci-
sion, and if the hearing officer considers it necessary to have an additional
medical assessment, one will be obtained at agency expense and made part of
the record.18 Perceptions of process control are ensured in the following
manner. The person seeking a hearing must be given an opportunity to exam-
ine, at a reasonable time before and during the heaing, the content of the case
file and all documents and records to be used by the state or local agency at
the hearing. The person also must be given the opportunity to (1) bring wit-
nesses; (2) establish all pertinent facts and circumstances; (3) present an argu-
ment without undue interference; and (4) question or refute any testimony or
evidence, including opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.
219
Furthermore, the federal regulations also require that hearing recommen-
dations or decisions be based exclusively on evidence introduced at the hear-
214. Under the federal regulations, the state's hearing system must provide for a hearing
before the state Medicaid agency or for an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with a
right to appeal to the state agency. 42 C.F.R. § 431.202 (1994). Moreover, the hearing sys-
tem must meet the due process standards set forth in Goldberg. A hearing must be provided
to any applicant who requests it because a claim for services has been denied or has not
been acted upon with reasonable promptness. Medicaid recipients who believe the agency has
taken an action erroneously also are entitled to a hearing. After proper notice, if "the recip-
ient requests a hearing before the date of action, the agency may not terminate or reduce
services until a decision is rendered after the hearing unless lilt is determined at the hearing
that the sole issue is one of Federal or State law or policy." 42 C.F.R. § 431.230(a)(1)
(1994).
215. 42 C.F.R. § 431.232 (1994).
216. 42 C.F.R. § 431.233(a) (1994).
217. 42 C.F.R. § 431.233(b) (1994).
218. 42 C.F.R. § 431.240(b) (1994).
219. 42 C.F.R. § 431.242 (1994).
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ing20 and that the claimant has access to the record at a convenient place
and time.221
By requiring a written decision that summarizes the facts and identifies
the regulations in support of the decision, consistency and rationality are pro-
moted.2 2 In a de novo hearing, the decision must specify its underlying ra-
tionale and identify the supporting evidence and applicable regulations.
223
The public also is allowed access to all agency hearing decisions, subject to
private information safeguardsY.2 4 Finally, the agency must notify the claim-
ant in writing of the decision and inform him or her of the right to either
request a state agency hearing or seek judicial review to the extent avail-
able.225
In sum, the Medicaid fair hearing process includes all of the major proce-
dural safeguards of an adversary trial:
* Timely and adequate notice disclosing the grounds for the action;
* An opportunity to present arguments, witnesses and evidence to the
decision maker;
* An opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
* Right to retain counsel at personal expense;
* A written statement by the decision maker of the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the decision; and
* An impartial decision maker.226
The provision of trial-like procedural safeguards is clearly consistent with
Mashaw's moral judgment model, which places a premium on fairness in
decision making, particularly from the patient's standpoint. The availability of
these traditional procedural safeguards apparently stems from the very serious
threat the loss of health care benefits poses to indigent citizens, since they lack
the financial resources to purchase essential health care services that have been
erroneously denied. However, outside the realm of Medicaid's focus on the
most economically vulnerable citizens, the broader context of health care
reform will likely demand that the emphasis on achieving fairness from the
patient's standpoint be balanced against the goals of accuracy (awarding valid
claims and denying invalid ones) and efficiency (conserving administrative,
judicial, and health care resources).
220. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(a) (1994).
221. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244 (c) (1994).
222. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(d) (1994).
223. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(e) (1994).
224. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(g) (1994).
225. 42 C.F.R. § 431.245 (1994).
226. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970); see generally Friendly, supra
note 43, at 1267.
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B. Medicare
Congress established the Medicare program in 1965 to provide health
insurance for the elderly.2" The Medicare system is divided into two major
branches: Part A and Part B. Part A covers hospital, skilled nursing home,
hospice, and home health services, and Part B covers physician services, other
outpatient care, and some home health services." 8
For beneficiary appeals under Part A, a peer review organization (PRO)
initially determines whether a hospital service is a covered Medicare benefit.
The beneficiary can obtain reconsideration of this initial determination from
the same PRO, but not from the specific individuals who made the initial
determination;229 this requirement is apparently aimed at promoting percep-
tions of impartiality. For skilled nursing and home health services, a fiscal in-
termediary makes the initial coverage and payment determination, and benefi-
ciaries can obtain more independent reconsideration of the initial determination
from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).2 ' "The reconsider-
ation is basically a paper review at which the beneficiary is generally not pres-
ent or represented by counsel. In the PRO reconsideration procedure, the bene-
ficiary, physician, or hospital may submit additional information and examine
the material on which the PRO based its initial determination." '' Determina-
tions made by fiscal intermediaries on claims of $100 or more are subject to
an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (AU)232 and to
judicial review in federal district court for claims of $1,000 or more. 33
These amount in controversy requirements clearly limit the expenditure of
administrative and judicial resources on relatively smaller claims. However,
perceptions of fairness are likely to be low among members of the public who
have several hundred dollars in dispute with no recourse to judicial review.
Moreover, given that the reconsideration phase does not involve an oral hear-
ing or some other procedure to promote voice and perceptions of process
control, individuals with claims under $100 may view the lack of opportunity
for administrative review as unfair.
227. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Dis-
putes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, I ADMIN. L.J. 1, 5 (1987).
228. Eleanor D. Kinney, In Search of Bureaucratic Justice-Home Health Benefits in the
1980s, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 254 (1990). The Medicare appeals system under Part A is
further divided into separate branches for provider appeals of payment determinations on the
one hand, and beneficiary appeals of coverage determinations on the other. Under Part B,
beneficiary appeals of both coverage and payment determinations are reviewed under a com-
bined process. However, providers do not have appeal rights under Part B unless they accept
assignment of Part B Benefits from beneficiaries. Kinney, supra note 227, at 39-40.
229. 42 C.F.R. §§ 473.16, 473.28(b) (1994).
230. 42 C.F.R. § 405.715 (1994); Kinney, supra note 227, at 41.
231. Kinney, supra note 227, at 41.
232. 42 C.F.R. § 405.720 (1994).
233. 42 C.F.R. § 405.730 (1994). Determinations made by PROs regarding hospital cov-
erage on claims of $200 or more are subject to administrative review by an ALJ and to
judicial review in federal district court for claims of $2,000 or more. 42 C.F.R. §§
473.40(a), 473.46(b) (1994).
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According to Eleanor Kinney, a legal scholar who has written extensively
in the area of Medicare appeals:
The ALJ proceeding is the first opportunity for an oral hearing at
which a beneficiary may personally appear and plead his case, al-
though an oral hearing may be waived. The role of the AU in Part A
coverage appeals, as in other Social Security Program appeals, is that
of a non-partisan examiner rather than a judge in an adversarial hear-
ing. In these proceedings, HHS is not represented by counsel, but the
individual claimant may be represented by counsel if desired. The
ALJ has primary responsibility for developing the record, in contrast
to conventional adjudicative proceedings in which counsel for the
parties has this responsibility. There is also an expedited appeals
process for cases where the beneficiary has claimed, and HHS agrees,
that the only factor preventing a favorable decision for the beneficiary
is a statutory or regulatory provision that the beneficiary maintains is
unconstitutional.2 3
Thus, the hybrid procedural requirements of the administrative hearing
apparently attempt to balance the fairness enhancing potential of procedures
that allow claimants to voice their concerns through oral presentation on the
one hand, with the accuracy enhancing potential of inquisitorial procedures
and positive case management on the other. A claimant dissatisfied with the
hearing decision may request review by the Appeals Council in the Social
Security Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals. 2 35 The Appeals
Council also may initiate review on its own.2"6 The Appeals Council may
review a case if it appears that there was an abuse of discretion committed by
the ALJ, an error of law, a decision rendered without the support of substan-
tial evidence on the record, or "a broad policy or procedural issue that may
affect the general public interest."27
The Medicare appeals procedures under Part B first require an initial
coverage determination be made by a carrier, or by a hearing officer where a
claim has not been acted on by the carrier with reasonable promptness.23
Upon making an initial determination, the carrier issues a notice of initial
determination to each party to the determination and informs them of their
right to a review of the initial determination, performed by the carrier.239 In
this review determination, the carrier must make a separate determination
affirming or revising the initial determination.2" The notice for the review
determination must state the basis for the determination and advise the parties
of their right to a fair hearing when the amount in controversy is $100 or
234. Kinney, supra note 227, at 42 (footnotes omitted).
235. 42 C.F.R. § 405.724 (1994); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1994).
236. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1994).
237. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (1994).
238. 42 C.F.R. § 405.803 (1994).
239. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.803, 405.807 (1994).
240. 42 C.F.R. § 405.810 (1994).
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more.2" According to Kinney:
The fair hearing for claims of $100 or more is an oral hearing
conducted by a hearing officer selected by the carrier. At a fair hear-
ing, the hearing officer may be disqualified if "prejudiced or partial
with respect to any party" or has "any interest in the matter before
him." The regulations expressly provide that the hearing officer is an
employee of the carrier may not serve as "prima facie cause for dis-
qualification," and as a matter of fact, many hearing officers are
carrier employees. 42
Although some regulations allow a claimant to request a hearing officer
withdraw on the basis of prejudice, partiality, or conflict of interest, allowing
carrier employees to serve as hearing officers seems unlikely in any case to
inspire high ratings on subjective procedural justice criteria assessing impar-
tiality. 243
At the fair hearing, the claimant may be represented by counsel, present
evidence and make oral arguments, examine all witnesses, and submit written
briefs.2" Moreover, the hearing officer is authorized to examine witnesses,
consistent with an inquisitorial approach to fact finding.245 The decision must
contain findings of fact and a statement of reasons, and be in writing and
based on the record."l The decision is final and binding on all parties unless
reopened and modified by the hearing officer according to specified require-
ments."" Claimants are entitled to administrative review before an ALJ on a
Part B claims of $500 or more248 and to judicial review in federal district
court for claims of $1000 and above.249
Again, although the amount in controversy requirements limit the expendi-
ture of administrative and judicial resources on relatively smaller claims, per-
ceptions of fairness are likely to be low among members of the public who
have up to $500 in dispute with no recourse to administrative or judicial re-
view. Perceived unfairness may be fueled by the fact that claims between $100
and $500 are reviewed by a hearing officer chosen by the carrier, often an
employee, and individuals with claims of up to $100 are not assured adequate
opportunity to directly voice their grievances. As a possible consequence, wide
scale perceptions of unfairness among the large number of beneficiaries with
relatively small claims could lead to gradual erosion of satisfaction and public
support for the legislative scheme.2"
241. 42 C.F.R. § 405.811 (1994).
242. Kinney, supra note 227, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
243. 42 C.F.R. § 405.824 (1994).
244. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.826, 405.830 (1994).
245. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.830 (c) (1994).
246. 42 C.F.R. § 405.834 (1994).
247. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.835-.842 (1994).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 422.203 (1994).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210 (1994).
250. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-39 (1990) (discuss-
ing relationship between legitimacy and compliance).
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C. Health Maintenance Organizations
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) provide a defined package of
medical services to their enrollees for a fixed payment."' In essence, HMOs
are in a dual relationship with consumers, assuming the role of insurer and
service provider. Problems associated with this dual relationship have been
summarized as follows:
The principal disadvantage of an HMO is its inherent tendency
toward underservicing enrollees, especially with regard to more ex-
pensive services. Since subscribers pay a fixed amount in advance for
covered services, HMOs have a financial interest in minimizing the
total costs of the services rendered; the greater the excess of premium
revenues over the cost of delivering services, the greater the surplus
available for distribution, whether in the form of profits to investors,
incentive payments to participating physicians, or expanded benefits
for subscribers. In theory, an HMO will cut costs by curbing
overutilization of hospital services and substituting less expensive
ambulatory care; in practice, an HMO may, absent appropriate safe-
guards, seek to cut costs by reducing the amount of services provided
through such rationing devices as low physician-patient ratios, under-
bedding, or unduly restrictive prior authorization procedures.
252
Thus, the establishment of fair and objective procedures to review coverage
decisions in this climate of cost-containment is important.
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (the "HMO Act")
2 53
was adopted by Congress to encourage the development of HMOs and to
"assure that HMOs were structured to promote quality and access while re-
straining costs."2' The HMO Act sought to facilitate the development of
HMOs by providing grants and loans to help meet start up costs and by pro-
viding HMOs with access to consumers with purchasing power; employers of
twenty-five or more employees were required to offer them the option of
membership in any federally qualified HMO in their service area. 5
Under the HMO Act, HMOs are required to provide "meaningful proce-
dures for hearing and resolving grievances" between the organization and its
members.2 " The grievance procedures must assure that: (1) complaints are
transmitted promptly to the appropriate HMO decision making levels with the
authority to take corrective action; and (2) appropriate action is promptly taken
which includes a full investigation if necessary and notification of concerned
parties regarding the HMO's investigation results.5 7
251. ANNAS et al., supra note 23, at 774-75.
252. Andreas G. Schneider & Joanne B. Stem, Health Maintenance Organizations and
the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 90, 97-98 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
254. ANNAS et al., supra note 23, at 780.
255. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(a) (1988).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(5) (1988).
257. 42 C.F.R. § 417.124(g) (1994).
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Although the specific grievance procedures adopted by HMOs vary con-
siderably across organizations, the following procedures established by Health
America-Lincoln, a Mutual of Omaha Company, serve as an illustrative exam-
ple of grievance procedures established by an HMO.258 The relevant proce-
dures specified in their group service contract (the "Plan") can be summarized
as follows:2 9
The Plan attempts to resolve most grievances informally within thirty days
through a Member Services Department. Grievances should be reported within
ninety days by calling or writing the Member Services Department. When
informal intervention fails to produce a satisfactory resolution to a reported
grievance, the claimant may request review by the Plan's Member Satisfaction
Committee. Requests for formal review by the Member Satisfaction Commit-
tee must be made in writing to the Member Services Representative. The
Member Satisfaction Committee may hold hearings and call witnesses to assist
in resolving formal grievances, although such hearings are not explicitly re-
quired. In any case, the decision of the Member Satisfaction Committee will
be communicated to the aggrieved claimant within sixty days of the formal
review request unless the Plan notifies the claimant that additional time will be
required.
Any claimant who is dissatisfied with the Member Satisfaction
Committee's decision may appeal to the Plan's Board of Directors. The claim-
ant must send'a written request for reconsideration to the Member Services
Department within fifteen days of receiving the Member Satisfaction
Committee's decision. Either the Board of Directors or a designated Grievance
Committee will review the grievance and the recommendation of the Member
Satisfaction Committee within sixty days of receiving the appeal. The claimant
and the other involved parties may be invited to the meeting to discuss the
appeal; however, the claimant is not explicitly entitled to appear before the
decision making body.
The claimant will be notified in writing of the Plan's final decision within
ten working days of the meeting held to consider the appeal. The Plan prohib-
its the claimant from bringing a legal action against the Plan regarding a dis-
pute until all internal grievance procedures are exhausted.2"
Overall, much of the "process control" is left to the discretion of decision
makers at different levels of authority within the HMO. The claimant is not
guaranteed the right to present arguments and evidence orally or to bring and
challenge witnesses. Moreover, the impartiality of decision makers is clearly
suspect under any standard reflecting common sense. As a consequence, pa-
tients with grievances may feel unfairly treated under the established grievance
258. Health America-Lincoln: Group Service Contract, 16-17 (1993).
259. Id.
260. Id. "Any Member who files a formal grievance thereby authorizes the Plan or any-
one designated by the Plan to review or disseminate as necessary to the resolution of the
grievances, such Member's individual medical records, without notice to any person." Id. at
17. Obviously, this last requirement leaves something to be desired regarding a patient's
interest in privacy.
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procedures. Those who receive unfavorable outcomes may be more likely to
pursue legal actions than they would have been under a grievance process that
promoted greater perceptions of procedural justice. As the research evidence
suggests, such increased perceptions of fairness are associated with greater
voice, impartiality, and respect for dignitary interests, including privacy.26" '
Finally, Congress did not specifically create a private right of action with-
in the HMO Act. Thus, with the exception of Medicare beneficiaries, an indi-
vidual who enrolls in an HMO is not authorized to bring a civil action in
federal court to challenge a benefit denial.262 However, the Department of
Health and Human Services is authorized to bring a federal civil action in
order to enforce an HMO's Compliance with the Act.263 The Department's
enforcement action may be based on a patient's complaint regarding a denial
of services or reimbursement. However, such enforcement actions have not
been "sufficient to ensure effective remedial action for individual or class
harms," which has led some health care reform advocates to argue that the
private right to legally enforce entitlement to benefits should be expressly
provided for by statute under any health care reform legislation.264
D. Fee-For-Service
Disputes between insurers and consumers in fee-for-service plans may be
governed by state insurance law, contract and tort principles, as well as federal
legislation such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"),165 depending on the jurisdiction and whether health insurance is
provided through employment.2" Regardless of specific jurisdictional and
procedural requirements, practicality often constrains the pursuit of remedies
against insurers.
[D]isputes are frequent between subscribers and insurers over the
medical necessity of provided services and over other conditions on
liability. Yet there are few litigated disputes and surprisingly few
appellate decisions. Some industry experts claim that this is because
disputes over coverage are either negotiated informally or handled
through formal arbitration .... [Miany health insurance policies ex-
261. See Tyler, supra note 176, at 121-27. Obviously, whether greater perceived proce-
dural justice leads to decreased appeals and litigation is an empirical question that warrants
further investigation. HMOs and other types of health care organizations may also be inter-
ested in determining whether perceived procedural injustice contributes to consumer dissatis-
faction and increases the likelihood that they will change plans during an open enrollment
period.
262. Medicare recipients who enroll in a federally qualified HMO are entitled to proce-
dures regarding initial determinations, reconsideration, hearings, Appeals Council Review, and
federal judicial review that are similar to those provided to Medicare beneficiaries who par-
ticipate in fee-for-service plans. 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.600-.638 (1994).
263. 42 C.F.R. § 417.163 (1994).
264. Jane Perkins & Abigail English, Designing Health Care That Meets Children's
Needs, YOUTH L. NEWS, July-Aug. 1993, at 1, 6.
265. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
266. ANNAS et al., supra note 23, at 155-56.
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plicitly require arbitration of these and most other disputes over cov-
erage or eligibility. But it is also apparent that the size of the claim
and the nature of the available remedy are also controlling factors. To
the extent that the claim is based solely on a contract theory, the
judgment is likely to be only for the amount of the disputed claim, an
amount that may not justify the time and expense of litigation. It is
only in cases ... where the plaintiff can claim a tort action and, pos-
sibly, punitive damages that the pursuit of a judicial remedy may be
practical.267
Like HMOs, the specific internal grievance procedures adopted by fee-for-
service insurance plans vary across different insurers. However, many fee-for-
service health insurance plans provide grievance procedures that are similar to
those provided in the following Mutual of Omaha plan:2" Claims for re-
imbursement are initially processed by a claims examiner. If the subscriber is
not satisfied with the initial determination, the claim may be appealed and
reviewed by a technical assistant, who is higher up in the chain of command.
At that point, the technical assistant may seek additional records from the
provider. If the subscriber is dissatisfied with the first appeal, the determina-
tion may be appealed to a claims manager, whose determination may in turn
be reviewed by a branch manager. In Nebraska, the subscriber is also entitled
to appeal a denied claim to the Nebraska Department of Insurance, which will
review the claim and make a recommendation to the insurer regarding its
findings.2" Moreover, if, after a hearing, the insurance director finds an
insurer has engaged in an unfair claims settlement practice, the findings are
reduced to writing and the insurer is issued a cease and desist order. The
insurer also may be subject to penalties for flagrant or repeated unfair practic-
es or for violation of the cease and desist order.2 "0 Claimants may also pur-
sue their claims against insurers in state court.
As mentioned above, specific grievance procedures can vary from one
fee-for-service plan to another and from state to state. Many criticisms of the
grievance and appeals procedures established by HMOs also apply to fee-for-
service plans: Much of the "process control" is left to the discretion of deci-
sion makers at different levels of authority within the organization. Oral hear-
ings typically are neither mandated nor provided, and the decision makers
reviewing the claims can hardly be characterized as impartial. As a conse-
quence, patients with grievances may feel unfairly treated under the estab-
lished grievance procedures; this may fuel consumer dissatisfaction, which in
turn may influence consumer evaluations and subsequent choice of health
plans during an open enrollment period.
267. Id. at 157.
268. The outline of grievance procedures is based on a telephone conversation with cus-
tomer service representatives at Mutual of Omaha.
269. Unfair Insurance Claims Settlement Practices Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1536 to -
1544 (1993); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS., T. 210, Ch. 61, §§ 001 to Oil (1992).
270. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1542 to -1543 (1993).
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V. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE TO NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS
The reform of our health care delivery system will require an ongoing
effort. Regardless of the specific timing and nature of health care reforms
adopted, there will be increased demands on the claims review process as
health care coverage is provided to more people. Moreover, mounting econom-
ic pressures toward cost containment in the delivery of health care services
will place new burdens on the claims review process if more people begin to
feel that their requests for services or reimbursement are being unjustly de-
nied. Thus, any health care reform program ultimately adopted must develop a
claims review process that strikes an appropriate balance between fairness,
accuracy, and efficiency in decision making. The next section examines health
care reform proposals of the Administration, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives of the 103rd Congress.
A. Summary of the Claims Review and Appeals Process in Proposed
National Health Care Reform Legislation
The health care reform plans proposed by the Administration,27' the
House,272 and the Senate273 in the midst of the Clinton Administration's
push towards health care reform would have required each health insurance
plan to establish a grievance procedure for enrollees to use in pursuing com-
plaints.274  The claims review and appeal procedures provided in the
Administration's Proposal, which are very similar to those outlined in the
House and Senate Proposals, are summarized below.
Under the Administration's Proposal, a claim could be submitted for
271. S. 1757, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Administration Proposal]. The
discussion and analysis will focus on the grievance and appeal procedures provided in the
health care reform plans proposed by the Administration and the Senate and House of the
103d Congress. These proposals represent comprehensive yet detailed efforts to deal directly
with due process and the health care claims process. All three proposals take a very similar
approach to these issues. In fact, the House and Senate proposals involve modifications of
the basic framework established in the Administration's proposal. All three proposals have
the same title: the Health Security Act. For the purpose of clarifying the discussion, referenc-
es generally will be to the Administration Proposal; the Senate and House Proposals will be
referred to only when they differ significantly from the Administration Proposal.
272. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) [hereinafter House Proposal] (sponsored by
Rep. Richard Gephart).
273. Amendment 2560 to S. 2351, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Senate Pro-
posall (sponsored by Sen. George Mitchell), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S 11492 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1994) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
274. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 1405(a); House Proposal, supra note
272, § 1405(a); Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 1123. Title V of the Administration,
House, and Senate Proposals addresses consumer protection. In the Administration and House
Proposal, subtitle C specifically covers remedies and enforcement, whereas in the Senate
Proposal, remedies and enforcement are covered in subtitle F. Section 5201 of the Adminis-
tration and House Proposals and § 5501 of the Senate Proposal specify the required health
plan claims procedure.
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preauthorization of services, or for payment or provision of benefits;... how-
ever, emergency services would be provided without regard to prior authoriza-
tion.276 Generally, claims would be processed in the following manner.
1. Urgent Requests for Preauthorization
An urgent request for preauthorization of services must be approved or
denied within twenty-four hours. 77 The request must be accompanied by an
attestation that failure to immediately provide the requested service could
seriously jeopardize the health of the claimant (or an unborn child in the case
of a pregnant woman), or that immediate service is necessary because the
claimant is at serious risk of harm to self or others. 78 Otherwise, the claim
is reviewed in accordance with the procedures set out below.
2. Initial Disposition of Claim
Whenever a claim is submitted to a health plan, the plan must provide the
individual claimant279 and any provider claimant 2 ° with written notice of
the plan's approval or denial of the claim within thirty days28 ' after the sub-
mission of the claim.
28 2
3. Reconsideration
A claimant may submit to the plan a written request for reconsideration of
a denied claim. The reconsideration review must be completed within thirty
days after the request for reconsideration. 83 Reconsideration reviews must be
conducted de novo, and may not be conducted by an individual who made the
initial determination to deny the claim. If the issue in dispute requires medical
expertise, the reconsideration must include review by a qualified physician."s
275. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5201(a)(1).
276. Id. § 1406(b).
277. The Senate Proposal would require that urgent requests for preauthorization be ap-
proved or denied within 12 hours. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 5501(c)(2).
278. See, e.g., Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5201(c).
279. An individual claimant is "any individual who submits the claim to a health plan in
connection with the individual's enrollment under the plan, or on whose behalf the claim is
submitted to the plan by a provider." Id. § 5201(a)(2).
280. A provider claimant is "any provider who submits the claim to a health plan with
respect to items or services provided to an individual enrolled under the plan." Id. §
5201(a)(3).
281. The Senate's version would reduce this time frame to 15 days. Senate Proposal, su-
pra note 273, § 5501(b)(1).
282. If the claim is denied, the notice must be provided within five days of the determi-
nation to deny the claim, and must set forth the specific reasons for the denial and include
notice of the right to appeal the denial. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, §
5201(b)(1).
283. Id. § 5201(b)(2)-(3).
284. Id. § 5201(b)(4).
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4. Complaint Review Office
Each state is required to establish and maintain a complaint review office
for each of its regional health alliances.28 Claimants may appeal claims de-
nied by their health plan to the appropriate complaint review office, provided
they have exhausted all remedies under the plan. The complaint must be in
writing and must be made within one year of the alleged violation date.2
Once a complaint is filed with the complaint review office, the claimant
may elect one of the following options:
- forego further review in the complaint review office and rely on reme-
dies available in a court of competent jurisdiction, with specified limita-
tions;
28 7
" submit the claim as a dispute in the Early Resolution Program; 28 or
" submit the complaint for review before a hearing officer in the com-
plaint review office. 9
Under the first option, claimants may rely on legal remedies and judicial
review outside the complaint review office, subject to conditions which the
Secretary of Labor presumably would clarify and specify .2'0 The other two
options for administrative review within the complaint review office are out-
lined below.
a. Early Resolution Program
Each State is required to establish and maintain an Early Resolution Pro-
gram ("ERP") in each complaint review office. The ERP must include forums
for mediation of disputes and other types of alternative dispute resolution,
including binding arbitration, as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe.' The
complaint review office must recruit qualified attorneys to serve as facilitators
for mediation proceedings under the ERP and to monitor and evaluate the pro-
gram on an ongoing basis. 2 2 A claimant must elect to submit a dispute to
mediation proceedings under the ERP within fifteen days of filing the com-
plaint with the complaint review office.29 3 Claimants may elect to participate
in mediation proceedings only by written agreement. Health plans must partic-
ipate in the mediation proceedings if a claimant elects this forum to resolve a
dispute with the health plan.2"
285. The Senate's proposal would require the establishment and maintenance of a com-
plaint review office for each community rating area established by the state. Senate Proposal,
supra note 273, § 5502.
286. See Administration Proposal, supra note 271. § 5202.
287. Id. § 5203(a)(1). The limitation applies to plans maintained by corporate alliances,
where administrative review and appeal under §§ 5203-5204 and § 5205 are the exclusive
means to review complaints brought by aggrieved persons under § 5202(b). Id. § 5202(d).
288. Id. § 5203(a)(2).
289. Id. § 5203(a)(3).
290. Id. § 5203(a).
291. Id. § 5211(a).
292. Id. § 5211(b).
293. id. § 5212(b).
294. Id. § 5212(c). The facilitator prepares the parties for a conference and serves as a
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The findings and conclusions made in the mediation proceedings are treat-
ed as advisory in nature and nonbinding. In the event a settlement is reached,
the settlement agreement becomes a binding contract between the parties,
which any court of competent jurisdiction can enforce." 5
b. Hearings Before Hearing Officers in Complaint Review
Offices2"
Hearing officers will be State employees who meet standards to be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Labor. The hearing officer will hear complaints
and any motions de novo and base his or her decision upon the preponderance
of the evidence. The decision constitutes the hearing officer's final disposition
of the proceedings and must include the hearing officer's findings of fact." 7
The hearing generally requires written testimony, but the hearing officer may
take further testimony or hear argument and can compel by subpoena the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence. 98
5. Appeal to Federal Health Plan Review Board
The Secretary of Labor must establish by regulation a five-member Feder-
al Health Plan Review Board (Review Board).2 The Administration and
House Proposals provide broad guidelines for the Review Board to follow in
its review process. For example, under the Administration's Proposal, reason-
able notice must be provided for each appeal before the Review Board and
procedures must be established to provide for the "orderly consideration of
arguments."3" The Review Board will review the hearing officer's decision
below based on whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence
neutral mediator at it to help the parties achieve settlement of the dispute. Id. § 5213(a).
This leaves the decision control with the parties. At conference, the facilitator must assist the
parties in identifying undisputed issues and exploring settlement. If settlement is reached, the
facilitator helps prepare a written settlement agreement. If no settlement is reached, the fa-
cilitator presents an evaluation of the dispute, including an evaluation of the likely outcome
of further administrative action or litigation, and provides suggestions for narrowing the is-
sues in dispute. Id. § 5213(c). The mediation proceedings must be completed within 120
days after the election to participate, with allowance for one extension under specified con-
ditions. Id. § 5213(d). The formal rules of evidence are inapplicable to mediation proceed-
ings; all statements made and evidence presented is admissible. The Secretary of Labor is re-
sponsible for promulgating confidentiality rules applicable to the mediation proceedings. Par-
ties may represent themselves or be represented by an attorney throughout the ERP proceed-
ings. Id. § 5213(e)-(g).
295. Id. §§ 5214-5215.
296. Id. § 5204.
297. Id. § 5204(a)-(d).
298. Id. § 5204(c)(2)-(3).
299. Id. § 5205. The Senate proposal does not provide for review by a Federal Health
Plan Board. Rather, the decision of the hearing officer is final and binding on all parties.
The complainant may directly petition any court of competent jurisdiction for enforcement of
the hearing officer's order. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 5504.
300. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5205(b).
[Vol. 72:2
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
on the record considered as a whole."' The hearing officer's interpretation of
contractual terms are reviewed under the less deferential preponderance of the
evidence standard.0 2
6. Review in Federal Court
Claimants can appeal the Review Board's final order to the relevant Unit-
ed States court of appeals if the amount or value in controversy exceeds
$10,000.3" The court of appeals' decision is subject to review by the United
States Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari or certification. 4
To summarize, the claims review and appeal process under the
Administration's Proposal would be as follows:
- Initial claims processing by the health plan, including the option of
preauthorization within twenty-four hours for specified urgent requests.
" Reconsideration of denials conducted by the health plan.
" Appeal to the alliance's complaint review office with the option of seek-
ing available legal remedies under specified conditions, participating in the
Early Review Program (mediation), or obtaining a hearing before a hearing
officer in the alliance's complaint review office.
" Review by the Federal Health Plan Review Board.
" Review by a federal court of appeals for claims in excess
of $10,000 with the possibility of review by the United States Supreme
Court.
Claimants also have an explicit private right of action against a regional
health alliance in state court or federal district court if the alliance fails to
carry out its statutory obligations."' Otherwise, the claimant must first ex-
haust any administrative remedies provided by law before bringing such an
action in either state court or federal district court."t Finally, each regional
alliance must establish an ombudsman's office to help consumers with prob-
lems arising from health plans and the alliance.3 7
The Administration's Proposal also would establish a National Quality
Management Program" to oversee "a performance-based program of quality
management and improvement designed to enhance the quality, appropriate-
ness, and effectiveness of health care services and access to such servic-
es.,," This latter emphasis on improved access to services is most directly
301. Id. § 5205(c)(1).
302. Id. § 5205(c)(2).
303. Id. § 5205(e). Although the House Proposal follows this same approach by allowing
aggrieved persons with over $10,000 in controversy to have their claims reviewed in federal
court, the Senate Proposal does not. See House Proposal, supra note 272, § 5205(e)(I).
304. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5205(e).
305. Id. § 5237(a).
306. Id. § 5237(b).
307. Id. § 1326.
308. Id. §§ 5001-5013.
309. Id. § 5001. The Senate and House Proposals both establish similar quality manage-
ment programs. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, §§ 5001-5013; House Proposal, supra note
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relevant to the claims review and appeals process because this process ulti-
mately impacts the approval or denial of services and the swiftness of service
delivery.
Section 5002 would establish a National Quality Management Council,
composed of fifteen members appointed by the President. The National Quali-
ty Management Council is required to "develop a set of national measures of
quality performance, which shall be used to assess the provision of health care
services and access to such services."' 0 Specific measures of quality perfor-
mance would be developed to assess, among other factors, access to health
care services by consumers, consumer satisfaction with care, and outcomes of
health care."' Additionally, the National Quality Management Council would
be required to "conduct periodic surveys of health care consumers to gather
information concerning access to care, use of health services, health outcomes,
and patient satisfaction. ' '3 2 Presumably, such consumer surveys could in-
clude measures assessing consumer evaluations of the claims review and ap-
peals process in terms of procedural fairness, although this is not specifically
mandated. Each health alliance, as well as the National Quality Management
Council, would be required to publish an annual performance report which
must include the results of the required consumer surveys.3
Section 5006 of the Administration's Proposal requires the development
and dissemination of practice guidelines that can be used by health care pro-
viders to guide the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and clinical management
of health problems." 4 As discussed above, such guidelines and treatment
standards will likely contribute to accuracy and consistency in administrative
and judicial decision making and could serve as an integral element of an
overall management system of quality assurance in claims processing and
review." '
B. Evaluation of Due Process and Procedural Justice Under Proposed
National Health Care Reform Legislation
The major strengths of the Administration's Proposal include the explicit
statutory specification of a claims review process, including mechanisms for
administrative and judicial review and enforcement. The procedures estab-
lished seem quite attuned to the due process concerns of claimants who have
grievances against health plans. Claimants generally are entitled to at least four
levels of administrative-type review, with the option of directly suing the
272, §§ 5001-5013.
310. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5003(a).
311. Id. § 5003(b).
312. Id. § 5004(a).
313. Id. § 5005(c).
314. Id. § 5006(a).
315. Although information regarding grievances filed against health alliances and health
plans would be routinely collected under a newly established Health Information System, the
disclosure of individually identifiable information would be subject to privacy and security
standards established under the Proposal. Id. §§ 5101, 5120.
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health plan in some cases, and the opportunity for judicial review in federal
court for very large claims. Claimants also have an explicit private right of
action against a regional health alliance and access to an ombudsman for assis-
tance with problems arising with an alliance or a specific health plan. Thus,
claimants have numerous outlets to voice their concerns. This can be a key
factor in promoting subjective perceptions of procedural fairness and increased
acceptance of decisions, both favorable and unfavorable." 6
However, the multiple tiers of review could inhibit claimants from having
their cases heard in a timely and cost-effective manner. For example, under
both the Administration and House Proposals, a claimant may wait up to thirty
days for the initial disposition of a claim and an additional thirty days for
reconsideration. The Senate Proposal shortens this time frame somewhat by re-
quiring that the initial claim determination be completed within fifteen rather
than thirty days. In any case, the claimant is not entitled to appear personally
at either the initial disposition or reconsideration phase of the review process.
Thus, a claimant could wait over two months under the Administration and
House Proposals and forty-five days under the Senate Proposal before having
the opportunity to appear in person to challenge a denied claim.
This delay could be shortened by giving claimants the opportunity to
present their case personally at either the initial determination or reconsidera-
tion phase. Waiting until the reconsideration phase would be more cost-effec-
tive, because many if not most claims submitted for an initial determination
will be routinely processed and decided favorably for claimants. On the one
hand, allowing for personal appearances at the reconsideration stage of the
review process arguably would cost too much and put too many demands on
health plan resources. However, an investment of time and resources here may
make economic sense in the long run if claimant perceptions that they are
treated more fairly and with greater respect translate into enhanced satisfaction
and loyalty to a particular health plan, given that consumers could change their
health plan on a yearly basis."7 Alternatively, claimants could be provided
with the opportunity to present their side of the case by phone, during either
the initial or reconsideration phase of the review process." 8 Besides any eco-
nomic benefit to particular health plans, resolving more disputes satisfactorily
at the health plan level would mean spending fewer overall resources on more
costly administrative and judicial review and appeal proceedings.
An alternative strategy for reducing delay in the appeals process would be
to allow claimants to appeal their denied claims directly to the complaint
review office. The complaint review office could modify its review options to
ensure that complainants have the opportunity to argue their case orally before
316. Lind and Tyler note that "procedural justice seems likely to be an important cri-
terion for medical policy-making. When life and death decisions are being made, as in the
case when scarce medical resources are being allocated, it is likely that procedural justice
will be especially important to the legitimacy of medical institutions and the acceptability of
their decisions." LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 213.
317. See Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 1323(d).
318. More empirical research is needed to determine whether and under what conditions
the opportunity for oral testimony by phone contributes to perceptions of procedural justice.
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a hearing officer (or an arbitrator, should the Early Resolution Program em-
brace binding arbitration as a method of dispute resolution).
One promising systemic aspect of health care reform under all three pro-
posals is the establishment of a quality assurance program and the prospect of
applying that program to claims processing. As discussed above, an effective
quality assurance management system requires the establishment of standards;
positive case management by the decision maker; periodic, independent assess-
ment of decision making quality; corrective action to upgrade substandard
performance; and ongoing evaluation. The quality management programs
proposed by the various plans meet several of these criteria and could be
adapted to address specific issues of quality assurance in claims processing.
For example, The Administration's Proposal would establish a National
Quality Management Council charged with overseeing the development of
treatment guidelines. The Council also would assess consumer access to health
care services and conduct periodic surveys of patient satisfaction. One obvious
way to improve access to care is to ensure the timely and efficient review of
health care claims. Moreover, patient perceptions that claims are processed and
reviewed in a fair, rational, and efficient manner are likely an important ingre-
dient of overall patient satisfaction. The Administration's Proposal requires the
routine collection of information regarding grievances filed against alliances
and health plans. This information could be incorporated into a quality assur-
ance program aimed at monitoring and improving the quality of decision mak-
ing in the claims review and appeals process." 9
At a more specific level of evaluation, individuals whose health is in
serious jeopardy would merit an expedited review of their request for
preauthorization of services. The erroneous denial of preauthorization in cer-
tain health threatening situations could pose risks that arguably rise to the level
of the potential deprivation considered in Goldberg. If so, then the issue be-
comes whether individuals, particularly the poor, who qualify for urgent re-
view are constitutionally entitled to the range of procedural safeguards spelled
out in Goldberg, or whether the balancing approach articulated in Mathews
should apply. The poor obviously are the most vulnerable because they lack
the necessary resources to obtain urgent care on their own, outside their health
plan, when preauthorization for such needed care is erroneously denied.
Claimants could forego an expedited hearing under specified circumstances
and seek judicial review, where available, in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Such judicial review might afford claimants with more explicit procedural
safeguards than the expedited administrative proceedings, but prompt judicial
review of requests for preauthorization of urgent care probably is unrealistic
for most claimants. Therefore, specific procedural safeguards protecting claim-
ants from erroneous denials of urgent care should be more clearly spelled out
in any health care reform legislation.
319. Although the Administration's Proposal apparently does not require specifically that
the National Quality Management Program focus on procedural justice in the claims review
and appeal process, the language of the Proposal clearly would not prohibit such a focus,
and the spirit of the Proposal would seem to encourage it.
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In terms of objective aspects of procedural justice, social science research
has focused on the capacity of a procedure to reduce bias or prejudice and
reach reliable decisions that are consistent with applicable standards. Inquisito-
rial procedures emphasizing positive case management have been associated
with less biasing influences on both witnesses and on attorneys representing
clients with weak cases. Under the Administration's Proposal, the reconsidera-
tion review conducted by a health plan is based on a written request. The
claim is reconsidered under a de novo standard of review by a decision maker
who did not make the initial determination; these requirements apparently are
aimed at bias reduction. However, the bias reducing benefits of an independent
decision maker's de novo review are undermined when the decision maker
likely is an employee of the health plan, with vested interests in the plan's
policies and economic well-being.32
The next level of review is a hearing before a hearing officer in a com-
plaint review office of an alliance. Here, previously denied claims are re-
viewed de novo and the hearing officer's decision is based on a preponderance
of the evidence. Testimony must be reduced to writing, which may promote
overall efficiency, but the hearing officer does have discretion to take further
testimony or hear argument. This places a great deal of process control in the
hands of the hearing officer and is likely to promote accuracy in decision
making. However, research suggests that disputants may prefer hybrid proce-
dures which allow them to fully express their arguments and evidence in the
case, while allowing the decision maker to independently seek out information.
Thus, these hearing procedures may promote accuracy and efficiency by giv-
ing the hearing officer considerable process control, but may diminish
claimants' perceptions of fairness and satisfaction by not guaranteeing them
the right to present their case orally. That is, claimants who, in the discretion
of the hearing officer, are not provided with the opportunity to state their case
in their own terms may feel less process control or voice and less respected as
participants in the hearing process. This may contribute to lower overall sub-
jective perceptions of procedural justice.
Several other process features likely will influence subjective evaluations
of procedural fairness. For example, because hearing officers would apply
treatment guidelines in many cases, perceptions of decision making accuracy
may increase. Further, hearing officers are employed by the State rather than
the health plan, which may enhance appraisals of impartiality. In turn, in-
creased perceptions of accuracy and impartiality likely will contribute to high-
er levels of overall satisfaction with procedural fairness.
On the other hand, although the opportunity to appeal the hearing officer's
decision to the Federal Health Plan Review Board provided under the Admin-
istration and House Proposals probably will merit high ratings on measures
assessing correctability, the social science studies reviewed suggest it will not
be an important factor in overall judgments of procedural fairness.
320. On the other hand, accuracy in decision making may be enhanced by the require-
ment that medical questions be reviewed by a qualified physician.
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The mediation component of the Early Resolution Program places both
process and decision control in the hands of the parties. As a consequence,
these procedures are likely to receive modest to high overall ratings on subjec-
tive criteria of procedural fairness. For example, claimants are guaranteed an
opportunity to present their case in person before a neutral mediator and are
therefore likely to perceive considerable voice or process control and to feel
respected. The use of legally trained mediators may contribute to perceptions
of increased decision making accuracy or quality, albeit, at higher costs than
would be incurred if trained mediators who are not necessarily attorneys also
are allowed to mediate disputes. Moreover, mediators who are employed by
the State rather than a health plan are likely to be perceived as more impartial.
Again, treatment guidelines may contribute to actual and perceived reliability
and consistency in decision making.
However, to the extent that a health care claim dispute can be character-
ized as a conflict of interest between a claimant and a health plan, leaving
decision control in the hands of the disputants is not likely to be the most
efficient means of conflict resolution. Thibaut and Walker's research suggests
that disputes involving intense conflicts of interest are better resolved when
decision control is vested in a third party (as in binding arbitration), particular-
ly when clear standards are present and the parties are under time pres-
sure.
32 1
Nevertheless, even in those cases in which a particular health care claim
dispute is better characterized as a difference in perspective or "cognitive
conflict" between parties regarding objective or factual matters, leaving pro-
cess and decision control in the hands of the disputants likely is not the best
means of obtaining accurate results. In fact, Thibaut and Walker argue that "an
autocratic system delegating both process and decision control to a disinter-
ested third party is most likely to produce truth." '322 In reality, many health
care claim disputes involve elements of both interest and cognitive conflict.
For examples, the parties may have conflicting economic interests over wheth-
er an expensive treatment should be provided under the health plan. The par-
ties also may have a cognitive conflict or difference in perspective over which
treatment is most effective for a particular health problem. Thus, hybrid proce-
dures more similar to binding arbitration may be more suited to resolving the
types of disputes that often arise in the health care context. Such procedures
would allow disputants to state their case, while allowing the arbitrator to seek
out evidence on his or her own. Decision control would be left with the arbi-
trator.
There is little basis for evaluating the Federal Health Plan Review Board's
procedures on objective or subjective grounds because no procedures have
been specified. However, one can ask whether this additional level of adminis-
trative review can be justified by improved accuracy given that correctability
or opportunity for appeal is not an important determinant of subjective percep-
321. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92, at 15.
322. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 148, at 547.
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tions of procedural justice. The Senate Proposal, which does not provide for a
Federal Health Plan Review Board and avoids this additional tier of review, is
clearly the most cost-effective approach which sacrifices little in terms of
claimant perceptions of procedural justice.
In terms of judicial review and enforcement, the Administration and
House Proposals generally receive high marks for providing an explicit private
right of action against a regional health alliance. However, the proposals
should clarify the process by which a claimant could elect to forego further
proceedings in the complaint review office and take direct legal action against
a health plan.323 Moreover, the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement
for judicial review in federal court seems high even in comparison to the
$1000 amount in controversy requirement under Medicare.324 However, the
overall desirability or necessity of making judicial review in federal court
more or less readily available depends in part on whether claim reView proce-
dures, provided prior to or in lieu of judicial review, resolve claims in a fair,
rational and efficient manner.
CONCLUSION
Law and social science converge on the following factors as critical ingre-
dients of individual and public perceptions that justice has been done: having
the opportunity to state one's case and to be heard; having one's claim decid-
ed in a rational, objective, and impartial manner; and being treated with digni-
ty and respect. Thus, health plans and reform proposals that take these factors
into consideration in developing grievance and appeal procedures are likely to
contribute to increased subjective perceptions of procedural fairness, which in
turn should contribute to increased acceptance of decisions, both favorable and
unfavorable. Overall, procedures for reviewing health care claims should en-
sure that people have a voice, that is, that they are able to present their side of
the dispute at the earliest possible time and to do so orally and in person.
Personal appearance provides the claimant with direct evidence that his or her
views are being heard. It also provides a direct basis for determining the im-
partiality of the decision maker and whether the decision maker has adequately
considered the claimant's views. This also enhances perceptions that one is
being treated with dignity and respect. Ideally, the person presiding over a
hearing should be impartial, in the common sense use of that term. In other
words, that person's income and employment should not depend on pleasing
the reviewing institution.325
323. See Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5203(a)(1).
324. The Senate Proposal does not provide for review of specific health care claims in
federal court, regardless of the amount in controversy. However, the Senate Proposal does
authorize the Secretary of Labor to assess civil penalties against health plans for unreason-
able denial or delay in the payment or provision of health benefits in the amount of $25,000
per violation ($75,000 if done in bad faith) and an additional $1,000,000 if a pattern or
practice of prohibited conduct is established. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 5505.
325. Moreover, decision makers generally do not need legal training, particularly those
presiding over the initial stages of the claims review process. In fact, knowledge of health
19951
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Providing oral hearings at the earliest feasible point in the review process
likely will decrease the need for multiple tiers of review and reduce overall
demand for costly administrative appeals and judicial review. In any case,
these recommendations raise empirical questions that could be evaluated as
part of a performance-based management system of quality assurance. In fact,
a management system of quality assurance established under national health
care reform could serve as a natural laboratory for basic and applied research
on due process and procedural justice, with empirical data serving as a source
of ongoing feedback for legal and policy reform.
care issues will be more important in many cases.
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